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Abstract
We analyze the multiple connections between inequality and growth from a 
theoretical perspective. We first consider the debate on poverty, the Kuznets curve 
and the convergence of developing countries in an open-economy context. The 
economy is dual as in Kuznets. The two sectors interact in several important ways, 
however, which makes them complementary. Labor mobility between the two 
sectors is not perfect, and capital flows from abroad can only be directed to one of the 
two sectors.
We show that inequality arises as a result of the limited mobility of labor across 
sectors despite the mobility of capital, and that it decreases monotonically with 
development. We also show how the “poor” benefit in several ways from an opening 
of the economy to capital flows, even though they may seem to gain less than the 
“rich” initially.
While duality may be an appropriate description of many developing countries, it 
does not fit the structure of developed economies. We then consider an extension of 
a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth with a continuum of sectors and where 
growth occurs through purposeful technological progress. Extending the process of 
creative destruction to jobs, we show how rigidities in the reallocation of the labor 
force across sectors generates equilibrium inequality.
We also look at how such rigidities affect steady-state growth, which allows us show 
that inequality and growth may be related in a non-linear and non-monotonic way. 
This sheds new light on the growth/inequality nexus and underscores why it may be 
difficult to find a clear empirical relationship.
Inequality has also tended to increase significantly over the past decades in most 
industrial countries. Skill-biased technological change is often advanced as the main 
explanation for such a rise. We note, however, that a large part of the increase in 
inequality can be attributed to the concentration of income and wealth at the very top 
of the distribution, which skill-biased technological change cannot explain.
We argue that the increased prevalence of winner-take-all markets may explain this 
phenomenon and seek to explain why agents may want to acquire human capital to 
participate in such markets, as opposed to education. We show how incentives may 
be such that the poor are attracted disproportionately to invest in winner-take-all 
markets and thus reinforce ex-ante inequality and harm growth.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
Growth and inequality are in many ways inextricably associated to each other. The 
abyssal inequality in standards of living between the richest developed countries and the 
poorest developing ones is a relatively recent phenomenon which has its roots in the ’’take 
off” of the former group in the late 18th to early 19th century as a result of the industrial 
revolution. In a context where world equity and cross-border redistribution remain an 
utopia, cross-country inequality is thus first and foremost a growth phenomenon.
In order to explain and understand cross-country inequality, one is thus bound to 
explore the roots and causes of the difference in growth performances between rich and 
poor countries. While the industrial revolution in the West and political and economic 
dominance and exploitation are arguably the main reason underlying the initial open­
ing of the gap in standards of living between developed and developing countries, such 
arguments are no longer sufficient when considering the more recent history.
One is thus forced to search for the factors that are most likely to explain why 
certain countries persistently grew faster than others, hence widening or closing the gap 
with the ’’leaders” . In many ways, this constitutes the ’’Holy Grail” of growth theory, 
particularly if it allows to recommend and implement policies that are susceptible to 
sustainably increase growth and hence standards of living.
There has recently been much public controversy regarding the consequences of a 
’’globalized economic system” on world inequality. World trade and finance are presented
by some as establishing an exploitative link between rich and poor countries, but also as 
reinforcing inequality within countries. That is, poor countries are said to be exploited 
by rich countries, while at the same time, the inequalities between rich and poor within 
rich and poor countries alike are further reinforced by world trade and finance.
After an initial review of the literature on growth and inequality, chapter 3 of this 
thesis seeks to analyze the issue of within- and cross-country inequality and globalization. 
We do not seek to discuss the arguments and contradictions of the anti-globalization 
advocates. Instead, we seek to address a few focused questions: is globalization, in the 
restricted sense of an opening up of an economy to capital flows from abroad, good or bad 
for the poor within an economy? Do the rich within a country benefit from globalization 
at the expense of the poor in that country? What is the impact of globalization on cross­
country inequality? What determines the size and timing of capital flows from abroad? 
Why do certain countries attract so much more capital than others?
While cross-country inequality appears to account for much of the difference in stan­
dards of living across the world, within-country inequality is sizeable in most countries 
and is an important issue for many reasons. First and foremost are social justice and 
equity. Such concepts are indeed more easily applicable in a national context and are 
more likely to lead to specific policy measures (redistributive taxation, public provision 
of basic goods, etc.) than in an international context. Within-country inequality may 
be particularly important as well to the extent that it may affect a country’s long-run 
growth performance.
The finks between within-country inequality and growth are clearly less obvious than 
those between cross-country growth performance and inequality. Yet it is important to 
understand them for policy purposes. The central issue and policy concern surrounding 
the growth/within-country inequality nexus is whether inequality is an inevitable side- 
effect of a growth-maximizing economic structure. While the traditional views based on 
incentives theory tended to point to a trade-off between equity and growth, more recent 
theories have highlighted channels through which inequality may in fact be harmful to 
growth. Such theories thus cast some doubt about the growth/inequality trade-off and 
underline the potential for redistributive policies to be growth enhancing.
After the analysis of chapter 3, which is more focused on developing countries, chapter 
4 seeks to understand what determines the level of within-country inequality in developed 
economies, and to analyze whether a trade-off between inequality and growth necessarily 
arises.
We build an endogenous growth model where the labor force is allocated across a 
continuum of sectors, each producing a homogenous final good using a sector-specific 
intermediate good of a particular technology vintage. Growth is driven by technological 
progress at the level of the intermediate goods, which are produced by monopolists. This 
allows us to analyze how the labor force is allocated to the continuum of sectors, how 
much each sector produces, and how labor is constantly being reallocated across sectors. 
Introducing frictions in the reallocation process, we relate these to the equilibrium level 
of inequality in the economy, and highlight a particularly complex relationship between 
inequality and growth.
The level of inequality within industrial countries remained relatively stable for many 
decades and significantly lower than in developing countries. Over the recent past, 
however, inequality has increased again in many OECD countries. Most explanations 
on the literature reside upon the concept of skill-biased technological change in one way 
or another.
These explanations, however relevant and elegant, fail to explain the phenomenon in 
its entirety. A significant part of the rise in inequality has indeed occurred as a result 
of the concentration of wealth at the very top of the income distribution, and not only 
among the privileged, but still relatively wide, category of high-skills (educated) people. 
An additional explanation to the phenomenon of rising inequality is thus called for.
Some have highlighted the increased prevalence of winner-take-all (WTA) markets, 
which are structured so peculiarly that among all the participants, only the winner (or 
a few people at the ’’top”) reap significant rewards. In such markets, the losers are 
little or not rewarded for their efforts (investment), even though the quality and extent 
of their investment or ’’performance” might be only marginally different from that of the 
winners.
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Chapter 5 extracts the key characteristics of such WTA markets to model them in 
the simplest possible way. The aim is to understand why agents are pushed to invest 
time and resources into such markets, as opposed to education. Contrasting the two 
investment possibilities, we seek to understand how the choices of the ’’poor” and the 
’’rich” are determined. We then seek to understand whether WTA markets offer some 
room for non-distortionary redistributive taxation that may reduce initial inequality and 
positively affect growth.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and G rowth, G row th  
and Inequality
2 .1  In tro d u ctio n
The growth/inequality nexus has been approached in many different ways in the liter­
ature. First, following Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) seminal work, a vast amount of 
research has been dedicated to further investigate and test empirically the issue of con­
vergence in standards of living across countries, as predicted by the neoclassical growth 
framework. This line of work is focused on whether inequality among nations has a 
’’natural” tendency to decrease with time.
A second strand of the literature, following initial work by Kuznets (1955) and Lewis 
(1954), has investigated the link between a country’s economic development (growth) and 
inequality within its own population. While Kuznets and Lewis’ work focused mainly 
on the evolution of inequality along a country’s development path from a rural (poor) 
economy to an industrial (rich) one, subsequent work in that line has widened to explore 
a broader set of issues relating growth to within-country inequality. The issues dealt 
with include whether growth through technological progress impacts income distribution 
in a consistent way, and how growth affects poverty (distinct from inequality) within a 
country. Empirical efforts prevail in this area.
A third strand of the literature, particularly important since the renewed theoretical
12
interest generated by research in endogenous growth, seeks to analyze the link from 
within-county inequality to growth. Of particular interest to this line of research is 
whether inequality is a necessary ’’side product” of an economic environment favorable 
to growth, or whether inequality itself may hamper growth. An important body of 
theoretical and empirical work has been created in this area.
A fourth strand of the literature, closely related to the second one, has been generated 
by the observation that inequality has increased significantly in the US, the UK and 
other industrial countries since the 1970s. An important number of papers have sought 
to quantify and analyze this phenomenon empirically, and a number of new theoretical 
investigations into the links between growth and within-country inequality have followed.
This chapter briefly reviews each of these areas of the literature. Given the extent of 
the literature in each area, we focus on the very essential contributions and those most 
relevant to the work of this thesis, and refer to other articles for more comprehensive 
reviews.
2 .2  C ross-C ou n try  In eq u ality  and  C onvergence
Inequality, when measured on a world basis, is essentially determined by cross-country 
differences in standards of living. While there is a significant degree of inequality 
among the population within the OECD countries and developing countries alike, the 
most striking differences are between average US citizens, French, Japanese or Germans 
and Indians, Chinese, Nigerians or Brazilians.
A straightforward application'of the neoclassical growth theory generates the conclu­
sion that growth in any given country is proportional to its distance from steady-state: 
the farther a country is from its own steady-state, the faster its growth rate. If one 
accepts the neoclassical growth model as a useful simplified representation of the econ­
omy and assumes that countries do not differ excessively in the (exogenous) factors that 
explain long-term growth and other characteristics, one is thus led to conclude that a 
set o f’’automatic forces”1 generate a natural tendency for poor countries to grow faster
*As coined by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
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than rich ones, and for the world to converge towards the same level of wealth. T hat is, 
in the long run we are all equal.
This idea that poor countries grow faster than rich ones unconditionally is the concept 
of absolute convergence. This concept receives little empirical support, as confirmed by 
the standard regressions of average per capita growth rate over the past few decades on 
the logarithm of initial per capita GDP (usually 1960 or 1965). Barro (1991) finds, 
to the contrary, that the average growth over the period 1960-85 is slightly positively 
correlated with the 1960 value of real per capita GDP. It seems rather intuitive, indeed, 
that countries do differ in many characteristics (other than rich/poor), including some 
that determine growth of the Solow residual, the unexplained growth in total factor 
productivity.
The concept of conditional convergence states more realistically that countries con­
verge in the long run only to the extent that they share the same core characteristics. 
Under such circumstances, the pace of growth is no longer determined solely as a func­
tion of whether a country is poor or rich, but rather depends on each country’s distance 
from its own steady-state.
A vast body of empirical literature has attempted to test the concept of conditional 
convergence and to estimate the speed of convergence towards steady-state. A good 
survey is provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). We will thus only provide a brief 
overview of the main results obtained in some of the most relevant papers.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) test the concept of conditional convergence by looking 
at the experience of US States2 and comparing it with findings across countries. While 
State-specific characteristics that may influence the steady-state do exist, they are of 
little importance relative to country-specific characteristics, they argue. Carrying out 
regressions on US States over different intervals covering the period 1880-1988, they find 
strong evidence of convergence, in the sense that ” poor states tend to grow faster in per 
capita terms than rich states even i f  we do not hold constant any variables other than
2Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 11, extend the test to regions in Japan and Europe.
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initial per capita income or product.”3 They estimate the (3 rate of convergence to be 
around 2 percent, implying a half-life of 27 years.
This provides evidence of convergence when characteristics influencing the steady- 
state are the same, or at least closely similar. They then proceed to show th a t con­
vergence is obtained in similar cross-country regressions, but only after controlling for 
country-specific characteristics that determine the steady-state. Using primary and sec­
ondary school enrollment rates in 1960, the average ratio of government consumption 
expenditure to GDP from 1970 to 1985, proxies for political stability and a measure of 
market distortion, they find evidence of /3 convergence of about 2 percent in a sample of 
98 countries, while no such convergence is obtained in the absence of variables control­
ling for country-specific steady-states. They find similar evidence when limiting their 
sample to 20 OECD countries, with or without control variables.
They take this as strong evidence in support of conditional convergence as derived 
from the neoclassical model of growth. They do recognize, however, that in order 
to agree with empirical estimates of the rate of ft convergence (about 2 percent), the 
neoclassical model requires -given reasonable values for the other parameters- a capital 
share coefficient in the vicinity of 0.8.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) propose an ’’augmented Solow model” in which 
output is a constant returns to scale function of three inputs: physical capital, labor 
and human capital. Adding human capital to the traditional neoclassical production 
function, they show that their augmented Solow model yields empirically verified predic­
tions about convergence and speed of convergence. Using the standard Summers-Heston 
dataset, they conclude that their augmented Solow model ”provides an almost complete 
explanation of why some countries are rich and other countries are poor”4, after con­
trolling for the saving and population growth rates. They also conclude, therefore, to 
conditional convergence, and find convergence rates in the vicinity of 2 percent as well.
Quah (1996, 1997) questions the 2 percent rate of convergence obtained in most 
studies by arguing that the regularity may be partly attributed to a statistical uniformity
3Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), p. 245.
4Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), p. 408.
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linked to the properties of times series with a unit root component. More importantly, 
he argues that empirical studies of convergence should focus on how distributions of 
countries across income evolved rather than on specific rates of convergence.
He finds evidence of clustering of countries towards a bi-modal or ’’twin peaks” 
distribution, leading to two ’’convergence clubs”: rich countries tend to remain rich or 
become richer, poor countries tend to remain poor or become poorer, and some movement 
occurs from initially poor to rich and initially rich to poor (Taiwan, Singapore, ... and 
Venezuela, respectively). This convergence club empirical result is justified through a 
model whereby countries endogenously put themselves into groups, as summarized in 
Quah (1999).
In addition to the issue of convergence, many authors have sought to identify em­
pirically the factors that determine a country’s steady-state. Solow’s model specifically 
pinpoints the saving and population growth rates as two main factors, but leaves unex­
plained the ”A” parameter (total factor productivity, TFP) both in terms of level and 
growth rate. Explaining TFP growth has been the objective of the vast endogenous 
growth literature, as initiated by Romer (1986, 1987, 1990).
The TFP growth literature is too vast to be surveyed here and is not the focus of 
this study. Comprehensive surveys are provided in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and 
Durlauf and Quah (1998). A particular factor of relevance to chapter 3 of this study 
needs to be analyzed in some more details, however.
Solow’s depiction of neoclassical growth was limited to a closed economy analysis. 
While providing a useful initial simplification, this has become more and more prob­
lematic both empirically and theoretically as countries have significantly opened up to 
trade and capital flows in recent decades. So much so that trade and capital flows have 
become key factors in shaping many countries’ macroeconomic and growth conditions, 
particularly across the developing world.
From the international borrowing spurt in the late 1960s and 70s to the debt crisis of 
the 1980s and from the renewed interest from private investors in the ’’emerging markets” 
in the early and mid 1990s to the financial crises of late, capital flows have indeed had
16
a significant influence on developing countries. Lucas (1990) looks at the implications 
of extending the neoclassical growth model to the open economy and wonders ” why 
doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries ?” A simple extension of the model with 
homogenous final and capital good, homogenous labor inputs, constant returns to scale 
and free trade and capital mobility generates immediate convergence across countries 
through massive capital flows from rich to poor countries.
Lucas proposes several alternative explanations for the failure to observe fast conver­
gence and massive capital flows. Introducing heterogeneity in labor inputs by assuming 
that workers are differentiated by their human capital, he concludes that such hetero­
geneity is unlikely to be sufficient across countries to explain the small size of capital 
flows. Building on Lucas (1988), he proposes to explain cross-country differences in 
the technology parameter ”A” by positive externalities on human capital (knowledge 
spillovers). While he finds empirical estimates of knowledge spillovers large enough 
to explain equalization of returns to capital across countries despite large differences in 
capital/labor ratios and hence the failure to observe large capital movements, he remains 
somewhat sceptical about this explanation in that it rests upon knowledge spillovers be­
ing local (not crossing national boundaries). An alternative explanation would rest on 
capital market imperfections, mostly related to ’’political risk” , i.e. the risk of repayment 
not being enforceable.
Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) make another attempt to reconcile the open- 
economy neoclassical growth model with empirical observations about capital flows and 
convergence. They follow Lucas (1990) by introducing human capital in an otherwise 
standard constant returns production function. By assuming that cumulative external 
borrowing cannot exceed the stock of physical capital AT as a result of capital market 
imperfections that prevent human capital H  to be used as collateral, they show that 
the steady state of the open economy is not affected with respect to that of the closed 
economy, but that the speed of convergence is increased. While convergence is faster 
with capital flows from abroad, market imperfections prevent immediate convergence as 
predicted from the simple extension of the neoclassical model, and they conclude that 
” the main impact of this effect [capital mobilityJ is likely to be small [on the speed of
17
convergence]
Beyond reconciling the open-economy neoclassical growth theory with empirical ob­
servations on capital flows and speed of convergence, many empirical studies have also 
sought to  measure the impact of openness on growth. Harrison (1996) measures the 
impact of several measures of openness (to trade, capital flows, etc.) on growth using 
a panel dataset for developing countries. She finds that her results are sensitive to 
the time period chosen for analysis, but concludes that ” when openness is statistically 
significant (...), we find that greater openness is associated with higher growth ”6 Other 
studies, including Barro (1991) and Balassa (1985) tend to show a positive association 
between openness and growth.
Dollar and Kraay (2001) focus on the effect of openness to trade on growth. They 
argue that post-1980 ’’globalizers” have experience higher growth than non-globalizers 
and OECD countries, hence exhibiting convergence with rich countries. They address 
issues of measurement errors on trade policy (policy-driven openness to trade), omitted 
variables and reverse causation and find a strong positive effect of trade on growth. They 
also argue that trade-induced growth does not systematically favor one type of agent at 
the expense of the other, i.e. that the poor benefit as much on average from higher 
growth than the rich.
2.3  G row th  and W ith in -C ou n try  In eq u ality
The literature reviewed in the previous section focused on inequality in average incomes 
across countries, and whether poor countries can be expected to catch up with rich ones. 
Kuznets (1955), on the other hand, analyzed the evolution of inequality within a country 
over the course of its economic development.
The first two lines of his paper read as ” the central theme of this paper is the char­
acter and causes of long-term changes in the personal distribution of income. Does 
inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a country’s
5Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 114.
6Harrison (1996), p. 443.
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economic growth?”7 His analysis is thus not about a  potential trade-off between in­
equality and (steady-state) growth, but rather about the evolution of income distribution 
as an economy develops from an agricultural structure to an industrial one.
His results are based on the assumption that ”in earlier periods of industrialization, 
even when the nonagricvltural population was still relatively small in the total, its income 
distribution was more unequal than that of the agricultural population. (...) The urban 
income inequalities might be assumed to be far wider than those for the agricultural 
population which was organized in relatively small individual enterprises.”8 He also 
argues, however, that income in rural areas would increase in relative terms as people 
migrate from the countryside to cities, and that the distribution of income within the 
industrial sector would be most unequal at the early stage of industrialization and become 
more even as the industrial sector settles.
This leads him to conclude that ” one might thus assume a long swing in the inequality 
characterizing the secular income structure: widening in the early phases of economic 
growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most 
rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases.”9 This is 
his widely discussed ” inverted-U curve” result. Note that Kuznets himself described this 
inverted-U relationship as one between income inequality and the stage of a country’s 
economic development, not as one between inequality and growth rate directly, as is 
often studied in the subsequent literature. He goes on interrogating himself whether 
the pattern of income distribution observed in older developed countries is likely to  be 
repeated in the early phases of industrialization in developing countries.
A vast array of papers attempted subsequently to test empirically Kuznets’ inverted- 
U result.10 Early empirical studies seemed at first to find a robust inverted-U rela­
tionship between income inequality and income levels (development). So much so that 
Robinson (1976) claims that it ”has acquired the force of economic law”11, before present­
ing a simple two-sector model with different income distributions and changing relative
7Kuznets (1955), p. 1.
8Kuznets (1955), p. 16.
9Kuznets (1955), p. 18.
10See Kanbur (2000) for an extensive survey of the literature.
11 Robinson (1976), p. 437.
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population shares working in each sector (secularly declining and rising sectors) tha t can 
replicate that ’’economic law”.
Early empirical studies were plagued with poor data quality problems, however, and 
had to use cross-sectional data to make inferences on a longitudinal relationship for lack 
of time-series observations. More recent studies as Fields (1994) and Bruno, Ravallion 
and Squire (1998) based on more comprehensive datasets have questioned the robustness 
and/or validity of earlier results. Providing and using a new panel dataset of higher 
quality, Deininger and Squire (1996) conclude that ” our data provide little support fo r an 
inverted- U relationship between levels of income and inequality when tested on a country- 
by-country basis, with no support for the existence of a Kuznets curve in about 90 percent 
of the countries investigated.”12
Barro (1999), however, disagrees with that conclusion and estimates tha t the Kuznets 
curve remains a clear empirical regularity, even though he also finds that the relation 
cannot explain much of the variation in inequality across countries or over time. A 
complete consensus on the empirics of the Kuznets curve has thus not been reached yet.
Slightly aside from Kuznets’ original argumentation about inequality and develop­
ment, economists have argued about the effect of growth (and particularly growth- 
enhancing policies) on the poor. This debate was initiated in particular as a result 
of developing countries embarking upon structural reforms aimed at restoring macroe­
conomic balances and growth, and their effect on the poor. Dollar and Kraay (2000) 
conclude that growth does benefit the poor in general, that nthe effect of growth on in­
come of the poor is no different in poor countries than in rich ones” and that ” incomes 
of the poor do not fall more than proportionately during economic crises.”13
On the issue of whether growth is sufficient to reduce (absolute) poverty or whether 
redistribution is crucial, Quah (2001) concludes that within-country inequalities play 
a small role in determining global inequality. Adopting a vector stochastic process 
that jointly determines inequality and growth, his empirical work leads him to conclude
12Deininger and Squire (1996), p. 573.
13Dollar and Kraay (2000), p. 1.
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that ” to understand the secular dynamics of personal incomes against a setting of world 
inequalities, those forces of first-order importance are macroeconomic ones determining 
cross-country patterns of growth and convergence. (...) The poor benefit more from 
increasing aggregate growth by a range of factors, than from reducing inequality through 
redistribution.”14 Such an analysis would thus lead to the conclusion that absolute 
poverty reduction is most likely to be successful through growth enhancing policies rather 
than through redistribution, at least in poorer developing economies.
Chapter 3 looks at some of the issues reviewed above. In particular, it seeks to model 
the evolution of wage inequality as a country develops and tries to provide an answer 
as to who benefits most from opening the economy to foreign capital; the poor or the 
rich? It also seeks to understand why developing countries attract a lot less capital from 
abroad than expected, why some countries attract a lot more capital flows from abroad 
than others, and why those tend to be relatively richer (in terms of capital/labor ratios) 
countries, contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical growth theory.
2 .4  E ffects o f  In eq u a lity  on  G row th
The emergence of endogenous growth theory in the 1980s suscitated a revival of interest 
and research in the underlying causes of the process of economic growth. Along with 
the drive to explain the exogenous ”A” factor in the neoclassical growth theory came the 
issue of whether inequality is a ’’necessary evil” to achieve high growth, or whether it 
may be harmful to growth. The issue is thus no longer whether growth or development 
generates within-country inequality as in Kuznets or whether cross-country convergence 
should or should not be expected, but rather resides in the causal link from within- 
country inequality to growth.
The traditional view was essentially that inequality is a ’’necessary evil” or side- 
product of an environment favorable to growth when individuals are endowed with dif­
ferentiated skills and abilities. Mirrlees (1971) showed how income taxation acts as 
a disincentive to effort (work) when individuals’ abilities are unobservable. Based on
14 Quah (2001), pp 2-3.
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the same approach to incentives, the traditional view essentially held that any type of 
policy aimed at ” manufacturing” less inequality would distort incentives and hence harm 
growth. Equality (inequality) is thus not necessarily harmful (beneficial) to growth, but 
” artificially” obtained equality in a setting where agents are endowed with differentiated 
skills and abilities is bound to hurt efficiency and growth.
Recent empirical and theoretical studies have challenged this incentives-based anal­
ysis of the relationship between inequality and growth, however. Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) regress the average growth rate of per capita GDP (1960-85) over the share of 
pre-tax income received by the 41st-60th percentile of the population (their measure of 
inequality) and other control variables. They find that equality is positively related to 
growth with a highly significant and quantitatively important coefficient.
The theoretical justification of their result is provided in a simple model with skill- 
differentiated agents who vote on a purely redistributive policy. They proceed to  show 
that in such a context, a political equilibrium represented by the amount of redistribution 
chosen by the median voter leads to more redistribution if initial inequality is high. 
They thus identify a channel from more initial equality (lower skill differentiation) to 
less redistribution, and therefore more investment and faster growth as a result of a 
better incentive structure. They conclude that ” income inequality is harmful to growth, 
because it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not allow full private 
appropriation of returns from investment.”15
This view does not fundamentally challenge the traditional incentives view, however, 
as it essentially claims that initial inequality is harmful to growth to the extent that 
it leads to distortions in incentives. It leaves unresolved the issue as to why initial 
inequality may be higher or lower and whether redistribution, by "manufacturing” more 
equality but also distorting incentives, may have a positive net effect on growth in the 
long run. Their major contribution is thus empirical in that they show that initial 
equality (whichever its reasons) is beneficial to subsequent growth.
Alesina and Rodrick (1994) adopt a fundamentally similar approach. They also
15Persson and Tabellini (1994), p. 617.
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model the impact of how ” an economy’s initial configuration of resources shapes the 
political struggle for income and wealth redistribution, and how that, in turn, affects 
long-run growth”1** The channels leading from higher inequality to lower growth are 
thus the same as in Persson and Tabellini, and they conclude that ” there will be a strong 
demand for redistribution in societies where a large section of the population does not 
have access to the productive resources of the economy. Such conflict over distribution 
will generally harm growth.”11
They also leave unanswered the question of how to achieve initial equality in ” access 
to the productive resources”. Their empirical results show that inequality in land own­
ership and income is negatively correlated with subsequent growth, similarly to Persson 
and Tabellini.
Easterly and Rebello (1993) and Perotti (1996) empirically investigate the net effect 
of redistributive policies on growth, i.e. the balance between the positive effect of higher 
equality and the negative effect through incentives. They both find that redistribution 
(measured by the marginal or average tax rates and/or different types of social spend­
ing) seems to have a positive net effect on growth in a cross-section of developed and 
developing countries.
Deininger and Squire (1996) use their higher quality and wider dataset to reassess 
some of the results obtained in the earlier literature, including Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) and Alesina and Rodrick (1994). They find that ”the negative relationship be­
tween income inequality and growth evaporates if, for example, we attempt to rerun the 
regressions by Persson and Tabellini using only the eighteen (out of fifty-five) high-quality 
observations contained in their sample.”18
In general, their work provides a cautionary note to those who pointed to a clear 
and robust negative relationship between income inequality and growth or to a positive 
relationship between redistribution and growth. The main conclusion of their paper 
is that ” there appears to be little systematic relationship between growth and changes in
16Alesina and Rodrick (1994), p. 465.
17Alesina and Rodrick (1994), p. 484.
18Deininger and Squire (1996), p. 573.
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aggregate inequality. (...) This lack of change suggests that efforts to find systematic 
links between inequality and aggregate growth may have to be rethought.”19
Deininger and Squire (1998) take another empirical look at the relationship between 
inequality and growth. While they do then replicate a negative relationship between 
initial income inequality and growth with their- high-quality dataset, they find tha t it 
is no longer significant once regional dummies are included in the regression. They do 
obtain a robust, negative and significant coefficient for the initial distribution of land, 
however, which they take as a better indicator of initial wealth inequality than the 
traditionally used income-based Gini coefficients.
Splitting their sample between democratic and non-democratic countries, they find 
that initial inequality (in income or land) is not significant in their growth regression for 
democratic countries. They take this as evidence questioning the validity of political- 
economy models of inequality and growth of Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994). Benabou (1996) provides additional modeling of the political economy 
arguments linking initial inequality and growth. He also provides a useful summary and 
review of the empirical literature.
Forbes (2000) challenges the view that a country’s initial level of inequality is neg­
atively related to subsequent growth and seeks address the issue of how a change in 
inequality will affect growth. Using the Deininger-Squire dataset and panel data es­
timation techniques, she finds that in the short and medium term, a rise in income 
inequality is positively correlated with subsequent economic growth. She estimates thus 
that countries do face a trade-off between lower inequality and higher growth, at least 
in the short to medium run. She also concludes, however, that ” sufficient data are not 
currently available to estimate this within-country relationship over periods longer than 
ten years, and it is possible that the strong positive relationship between inequality and 
growth could diminish (or even reverse) over significantly longer periods.”20
There is thus no genuine consensus on the empirics of inequality and growth. Signif­
icant evidence seems to point towards a negative effect of initial asset inequality (more
19Deininger and Squire (1996), p. 587.
20Forbes (2000), p. 885.
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than income inequality) on subsequent growth, however. A lot less certain is the contem­
poraneous relationship between inequality (or change in inequality, i.e. redistribution) 
and growth.
The theoretical arguments relating higher initial inequality to lower subsequent growth 
discussed so far all resided on political economy arguments linking inequality to  higher 
redistributive policies (or, similarly, social conflict) and hence negative effects on incen­
tives and growth. A second, and perhaps more important, theoretical line of thought 
underlines another channel of interaction. The argumentation rests mostly on credit 
market imperfections.
Galor and Zeira (1993) first explored the relationship between distribution and growth 
through human capital investment when credit markets axe imperfect. In a simple over­
lapping generations model where people have to decide either to work as unskilled in 
both period or to invest an amount h in human capital in period 1 and work as skilled 
in period 2 , they show that the distribution of wealth determines aggregate output when 
credit markets axe imperfect. They proceed to show how whether an agent of a dynasty 
remains among the skilled workers in the second period of his life depends on a critical 
amount of bequest he receives, which, in the long run, determines two types of dynasties: 
rich/poor or skilled/unskilled. They conclude that ”in the face of capital market im­
perfections the distribution of wealth significantly affects the aggregate economic activity. 
(...) Hence, growth is affected by the initial distribution of wealth, or more specifically by 
the percentage of individuals who inherit a large enough wealth to enable them to invest 
in human capital.”21
While Galor and Zeira’s argument resides both on capital market imperfections and 
investment indivisibilities, other models show that it carries through when investment 
is a continuous choice but exhibits decreasing marginal returns at the individual level. 
Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) show that in the absence of capital 
market imperfections and with decreasing marginal returns at the individual level, the 
optimal distribution of aggregate investment is to be equally distributed across the pop­
ulation. Capital market imperfections in the presence of initial inequality prevent such
21 Galor and Zeira (1993), p. 50.
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an outcome to be attained and thus have a negative impact on growth. Aghion and 
Howitt conclude that ” when credit is unavailable, redistribution to the poorly endowed, 
that is, to those individuals who exhibit the higher marginal returns to investment, will 
be growth-enhancing. Correspondingly, more inequality is bad for growth when capital 
markets are highly imperfect"22
Note that while investment indivisibilities are unnecessary to their argumentation, 
it is crucial that marginal returns to investment be decreasing at the individual level, 
which is a strong assumption. Also, investment indivisibilities are sometimes used as 
an argument as to why, in the absence of perfect capital markets, inequality may be 
beneficial to growth. Certain investment projects may indeed involve large set-up costs 
which may only be financed if enough wealth is concentrated among some individuals (if 
capital markets are not broad enough).
Chapter 4 looks at some of the issues reviewed above. Rather than looking at 
the effect of initial inequality on subsequent growth, it builds a model that explains 
the joint determination of growth and income inequality. Growth is determined in a 
model of endogenous growth in which inequality arises as an equilibrium outcome as 
a result of rigidities in the reallocation of the labor force across sectors. This allows 
us to derive a complex but explicit contemporaneous relationship between growth and 
inequality, through their interaction with labor reallocation rigidities. This complex 
non-linear contemporaneous relationship sheds new light on the debate and may explain 
why it is difficult to extract clear empirical relationships between growth and inequality 
in cross-country regressions.
2.5  T echnological C hange and In creasin g  In eq u ality
The recent rising trend in inequality in certain OECD countries, the US and the UK in 
particular, is a well documented phenomenon. Murphy and Welch (1992), Gottschalk 
(1993, 1997), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Atkinson (1996) and Machin (1996) 
provide comprehensive empirical studies reviewing the phenomenon and the pitfalls in
22 Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 286.
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comparing data across time and across countries. Despite these pitfalls, the consensus is 
that inequality (in earnings, income or other measures) has increased over recent decades, 
even though this is not necessarily true, or true to the same extent, in all countries.
Three main sources of rising inequality are traditionally identified. Autor, Katz 
and Krueger (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) highlight the increase in wage 
differential across educational cohorts and its roots in skill-biased technological change. 
There have also been rises in within-group inequality, however, as highlighted by the 
greater wage dispersion for high-school and college graduates, and an increase in age- 
related wage differentials.
The bulk of theoretical explanations to this phenomenon has focused on trying to 
explain the observed increase in the skilled labor premium, i.e. the rise in between-group 
inequality. Two main explanations are advanced: international trade and skill-biased 
technological change.
One of the most widely known results of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of 
trade is that countries specialize in the production of goods that require intensive use of 
the factors in relative abundance. Whether cross-border trade flows actually correspond 
to such a pattern has nevertheless always been hotly debated in the empirical trade 
literature. Wood (1994) and Wood and Ridao-Cano (1996) build on that argument 
and conclude that the globalization of trade flows leads rich countries to specialize in 
skill-intensive goods and poor countries in low-skill goods. This, they conclude, not 
only widens the skill premium in rich countries (increasing within-country inequality), 
but also reduces the skill premium in poor countries, which, they argue, means that 
nfree trade may not be the developmentally best policy for backward countries, since it 
retards their accumulation of skills by causing them to specialize in goods o f low skill 
intensity”2*
Whether a trade-induced shift in demand away from unskilled labor and towards 
skilled labor is sufficient to have generated the rise in skill premium in industrial countries 
is empirically somewhat dubious. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) conclude that
23Wood and Ridao-Cano (1996), p. 30.
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”the shift is due mostly to increased use of skilled workers within the 450 industries in 
US manufacturing rather than to a reallocation of employment between industries, as 
would be implied by a shift in product demand due to trade ( , . .)”24 It could also be, 
however, that trade would generate reallocation of employment within industries, say 
from standard textiles products to higher-technology and value-added luxury products. 
Such a phenomenon would not be captured by Berman Sz al.’s empirical approach, but 
could still be the cause of a trade-induced increase in the skill premium.
Acemoglu (1998) seeks to explain the rise of the skill premium through skill-biased 
technological change. He starts from the assumption that nnew technologies are not 
complementary to skills by nature, but by design.” 25 He then builds a model in which 
both the demand for and the supply of skills are endogenous. An initial increase in the 
supply of skills (as occurred in the US and elsewhere with the increase of college graduates 
in the 1960s and 70s) depresses the skill premium (substitution effect). The larger supply 
of skills also increases the size of the market for skill-complementary technologies, which 
generates a directed technology effect. If this directed technology effect is strong enough 
relative to the substitution effect, the long-run skill premium may turn out to be larger 
than initially, even if it is reduced at first. Under such circumstances, he shows that 
agents can be induced to further increase thg aggregate supply of skilled labor in the 
economy. His conclusion is that ” when there are more skilled workers, the market for  
technologies that complement skills is larger, hence more of them will be invented, and 
new technologies will be complementary to skills.”26
Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) note that skill-biased technological 
change remains a latent, unobservable variable, which cannot be easily and unequivo­
cally interpreted or measured. They then build a model based on the assumption that 
the elasticities of substitution between capital and unskilled labor and capital and skilled 
labor are different, effectively implying substitutability in the first case and complemen­
tarity in the second. Skill-biased technological change in their work thus ”reflects the 
rapid growth of the stock of equipment, combined with the different ways equipment in­
2 4 Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), p. 367.
25 Acemoglu (1998), p. 1056. - - .•
26Acemoglu (1998), p. 1082.
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teracts with different types of labor in the production technology. ”27 Calibrating and 
estimating their model, they find that it is able to account for most of the changes in the 
skill premium over the past 30 years in the U.S. through observable variables (capital 
equipment, labor inputs).
Aghion End Howitt (1998) build a model of disembodied technological change, where 
progress takes the form of general purpose technologies (GPT), i.e. innovations tha t are 
not sector specific, but that can be productivity increasing for the whole economy. They 
show how their model can replicate both cycles and a progressive increase in the skill 
premium as the innovation is adopted.
By assumption, a GPT affects the entire economy, and they claim that its adoption is 
in general non-linear for reasons related to strategic complementarities between sectors, 
social learning and other types of externalities. Adoption, they show, is slow initially 
before picking up quickly. This implies that the demand for skilled labor (able to 
work with the new GPT) is low at the beginning (below overall supply), implying a 
non-segmented market between skilled and unskilled labor. As adoption of the GPT 
picks up, skilled Eind unskilled labor markets become segmented, which generates a  skill 
premium. In their model, this premium later tends to fall as the entire unskilled labor 
force is ultimately trained to work with the new GPT (all sectors eventually adopt the 
new GPT).
Observing that a significant part of the recent increase in inequality has occurred 
within groups, Aghion, Howitt and Violante (1999) seek to explain this type of inequality 
through a model of embodied technological change with GPTs. They assume that 
workers are ex-ante equal but that their ability to adapt to new technologies is subject 
to history dependent stochastic factors. Three channels that increase the skill premium 
are identified: faster embodied technological progress raises the premium of adaptable 
workers; the generality of the technology makes it easier for adaptable workers to transfer 
their skills to new machines; the generality of the technology implies a lower retooling 
cost for old machines, which further increases the demand for adaptable workers.
2 7 Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000), p. 1030.
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However valid the trade and skill-biased technological change explanations may be, 
they are only likely to be part of the picture, as underscored by Atkinson (1999). He 
insists that ” we need to recognize that the distribution of income is subject to a variety of 
forces, affecting earnings, wealth and incomes. These forces include the policy choices 
made by governments affecting market incomes and fiscal redistribution. (...) Any single 
theory, such as that based on a global shift of demand away from unskilled workers, cannot 
provide a fully adequate explanation.”28
Aside from explanations residing on government interventions that affect market 
outcomes, it is crucial to note that not only has the rise in within-group inequality been 
particularly important, but, as Atkinson (1999) himself notes, empirical evidence shows 
that the dynamics in income distribution responsible for the recent increase in inequality 
has been concentrated on the upper part of the distribution. In other words, income 
inequality has not only occurred as a result of the poor becoming poorer (in relative, if 
not in absolute terms), but also as a consequence of the "middle class” loosing income 
shares in favor of the very upper class.
This phenomenon of concentration of income is particularly well documented in Feen- 
berg and Poterba (2000) who report on the shares of various measures of income and 
wages of the upper 0.5 percent of the distribution in the US. They show that this seg­
ment of the population mobilized 11.25 percent of national adjusted gross income in 
1995, up from 6.1 percent in 1976. Data from the US Census Bureau (2000) confirm 
this trend showing that the top 5 percent of the distribution represented 21.4 percent of 
aggregate income in 1998, up from 16.0 percent in 1976.
Virtually no theoretical papers address this issue of rising concentration of income 
at the very top of the distribution. Frank and Cook (1995) look at how winner-take-all 
markets have become more prevalent in the US recently. They provide a long list of 
such types of markets, where many ’’players” compete for very few but extremely high 
rewards. They do not provide any modeling of the structure of these markets, however, 
and the reasons underlying people’s participation.
28Atkinson (1999), p. 56.
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Chapter 5 looks in more detail at the dynamics of income concentration among the 
very top earners. It then analyses the characteristics and structure of winner-take-all 
markets and provides a simple modeling tool that aims to explain why agents may be 
attracted to invest in such types of markets as opposed to education. We then seek to 
understand whether WTA markets offer some room for redistributive taxation tha t may 
reduce inequality without much affecting incentives while positively impact growth.
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Chapter 3
W age Inequality and C apital 
Flows to  D eveloping C ountries
3.1  In trod u ction
Absolute poverty and extreme inequality top the list of the most pressing issues in the 
developing world. While it seems obvious that an increase in aggregate output in the 
long run is indispensable to lift people out of absolute poverty, it is often passionately 
debated whether growth enhancing policies benefit or hurt the poor in the short to 
medium run.
Such a debate has been particularly active since the implementation of structural 
adjustment policies in many developing or emerging market economies, mostly but 
not exclusively under IMF supported programs. A non-exhaustive list of growth- 
enhancing policies traditionally recommended includes fiscal adjustment, price liberaliza­
tion (market-oriented economic structure), reforms of the labor markets, privatization, 
and the opening of the economy to trade, foreign direct investment and capital flows 
(globalization).
Underlying the idea that (some) growth enhancing policies (may) hurt the poor, one 
usually finds the view that fighting poverty requires, at least in the short to medium 
term, redistribution of existing resources more than ’’expanding the size of the pie” , 
which is relegated to a secondary and longer term means to combat poverty. Growth,
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in such a perspective, is valuable only to the extent that it also benefits the poor, and 
growth enhancing policies are viewed critically inasmuch as they have redistributional 
consequences that may hurt the poor.
Kuznets (1955) argued that an initial rise in inequality is a ” necessary step” in a 
country’s process of development from a low-output economy based on agriculture to 
a high-output one based on industry, but that inequality would also fall subsequently. 
According to that view, some increase in inequality is thus required for a ”poor” economy 
to turn into a ”rich” one. While everybody is likely to be better off in the ”rich” stage 
than in the ’’poor” one, some people may thus suffer (at least in relative terms) in the 
intermediate stages.
Initial cross-sectional empirical studies that sought to test Kuznets’ inverted U curve 
hypothesis appeared to validate it to the point of giving it a ’’stylized fact” status, or 
even that of ’’economic law” (Robinson, 1976). More recent empirical work, however, 
has questioned these results and showed that cross-sectional studies could yield spurious 
results as a consequence of country-specific determinants of inequality (Fields, 1994, 
Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1998).
Panel data studies that control for fixed effects and with a significant time-series 
element are difficult to carry out given the lack of data. Recent work, however, shows 
that Kuznets’ postulate should not be classified as a stylized fact, let alone economic 
law. Deininger and Squire (1996) compile a new dataset o f ’’high quality” observations 
and find no support for the inverted U curve when tested on a country-by-country basis. 
Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) obtain an ordinary U relationship and point that 
"for most of the range of the data, inequality falls as average income increases.”
While addressing the issue of inequality along a country’s development path, Kuznets 
did not really consider the problem of poverty. Nor did he directly look at the relation­
ship between the growth rate and inequality, i.e. the relationship between the speed of 
development and inequality.
A vast array of theoretical work has sought to explain how inequality may affect 
growth. The traditional incentives-based theory, inspired by the work of Mirrlees
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(1971), argues that growth is maximized when distortionary redistributive policies are 
minimized. In other words, maximum growth is likely to be associated with higher 
inequality, inasmuch as agents differ in skills, efforts, etc.
More recent work has showed, however, that initial wealth or income inequality may 
be harmful to subsequent growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrick 
(1994) argue that high initial inequality is likely to generate political pressure in favor 
of redistributive policies, hence negatively affecting incentives and growth. Galor and 
Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) show that in the presence of capital mar­
ket imperfections and with decreasing marginal returns to investment at the individual 
level, initial inequality may yield lower growth without having to invoke distortionary 
redistributive policies.
The inverse relationship, from growth to inequality, has received less theoretical at­
tention. More work has been done on analyzing the distributional effects of particular 
growth-enhancing policies than on how growth in general affects inequality and the poor 
(absolute poor or relative poor). Dollar and Kraay (2000), in a recent empirical study 
covering 80 countries conclude that income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall 
growth, hence contradicting the view that growth disproportionately benefits the rich. 
They also, most importantly, argue that policy-induced growth (opening to international 
trade, lower inflation, ...) is as beneficial to the poor as it is for the overall economy.1 
This is not to deny, however, the potential distributional effects of certain specific mea­
sures as part of an overall package of growth-enhancing policies.
Critically also, Quah (2001) shows that within-country inequalities play a relatively 
small role in determining world inequality when compared to cross-country inequalities. 
His main conclusion is that the (absolute or relative) poor in developing countries ben­
efit much more from higher aggregate national output growth than from redistributive 
policies at the domestic level. His study has the main benefit of refocusing the debate 
on the fight against poverty in developing countries on the necessity to achieve domestic
^ h e y  conclude that ”the basic policy package o f private property rights, fiscal discipline, macro  
stability , and openness to trade increases the incom e o f the poor to the sam e extent that it  increases the 
incom e o f other households in so c ie ty .” (p. 6 ).
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growth, in priority over distributional issues, which are not negated but put into context 
in terms of potential effects.
These papers strengthen the view that combatting poverty in the developing world 
is achievable first and foremost through higher growth and faster convergence toward 
more advanced countries, more than through redistributive policies. Among the key 
policies that have recently been advocated to foster growth in developing and developed 
countries alike, ” globalization” and its materialization into freer movements of goods, 
services, capital and, to a much more limited and restrained extent, labor rank very 
high. Yet, free trade and capital movements are also the target of the most virulent 
opposition on the ground of their presumed distributional effects harming the poor. Not 
only are they assumed to hurt the poor within developing and developed countries alike, 
but they are also blamed for widening the gap between rich and poor countries, i.e. for 
generating divergence instead of convergence.
This chapter seeks to analyze a few core issues highlighted above through a simple 
growth model. W hat happens to inequality as the economy develops? W hat are 
the effects of liberalizing capital flows on growth, convergence and inequality? W hat 
determines the size and timing of capital flows from abroad?
We model a typical developing economy in a dual way that is more elaborate than in 
Kuznets in that we allow for interactions and complementarities among the two sectors 
of the economy. Focusing on the dual aspect of the economy allows us to consider the 
issue of convergence with free movement of capital across countries and to explain why 
it is not immediate and why certain countries attract more capital from abroad than 
others. The distributional effects of opening the economy to capital flows can also be 
analyzed simply and clearly.
3 .2  D o m estic  C ap ita l, U n iversa l C ap ita l, Socia l C a p ita l
Kuznets adopted a very simplistic view of dualism in that he assumed that the economy 
is divided in two sectors, agriculture and industry. In his work, as well as Robinson’s 
(1976) formalization, agriculture and industry are totally separate sectors that do not
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interact on the production side. Productivity in one sector is independent of output or 
productivity in the other, and the only channel of interaction is through shifts in labor 
allocation.
Later views on dualism in developing economies are more sophisticated. Instead of 
dividing the economy between agriculture and industry, development theory has tended 
to focus on a division between formal and informal sectors, traditional and modern sectors 
or, as in trade theory, between tradable and non-tradable sectors. Such a division is a 
lot more realistic in the sense that it allows for complementarities in production between 
the two sectors.
Aggregate output in a Kuznets style dual economy would take the form Y  = Y\ (Li, K \)+  
Y2 (Z/2 , K 2), where If, L* and Ki are output, labor and capital, respectively, in sec­
tor i. In the more elaborate version, aggregate output would take the general form 
Y  = f  (Z/i,Ki,Z/2 , K 2), which allows a range of interactions between the two sectors and 
encompasses Kuznets’ formulation. We will adopt a specific formulation for Y  in the 
next section and divide the economy in two sectors according to the type of capital that 
they use, and the way such capital can be accumulated.
One can observe indeed that a wide range of investments cannot be financed by 
international capital flows, but have to be paid for through domestic saving. Other 
types of capital infrastructure, on the other hand, are readily financeable by foreign 
borrowing or through flows of foreign direct investment.
We shall thus assume that two types of capital coexist in the economy: domestic 
capital, and universal capital. W hat will be henceforth defined as domestic capital and 
universal capital should be understood widely and are in no way limited to physical 
capital. Also, as will become clear later, the concepts should not be understood rigidly 
as time or space invariant. To the contrary, the distinction between the two types of 
capital are likely to be affected by government policies and the institutional framework 
proper to each economy.
The single most important component of domestic capital is undoubtedly human 
capital, and the infrastructure allowing its accumulation. Empirically, one can indeed
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observe that the installation of systems of basic education requires domestic financing 
and is not paid for by private borrowing or direct investment from abroad. Developing 
countries that have successfully managed to set up such systems have typically had 
high domestic saving rates, which generate the necessary domestic resources for such 
investments. Higher education systems are likely to be classified as domestic capital 
as well, even though this is a case where the distinction may get blurred. There are 
instances, for example, of universities setting up schools abroad, which we can consider 
as a way to finance higher education infrastructure through foreign direct investment. 
Some of the higher education system could thus be considered as universal capital.
The accumulation or preservation of human capital is also affected by the public 
health system. The installation and maintenance of basic public health services (vac­
cination, sanitation, basic care) in developing countries is unlikely to be financeable 
with external borrowing or foreign direct investment, and yet is an essential element 
that affects production. Such capital should thus unequivocally be classified as domestic 
capital. Yet, some types of high technology and sophisticated treatments might be of­
fered through foreign-financed private clinics, once again underscoring the possible blur 
between domestic and universal capital.
Domestic capital should also be understood widely enough to encompass the con­
cept of social capital. North (1989) argued that much of the growth of productivity 
that occurred in OECD countries can be attributed to the development of institutions 
that reduced transaction costs. Similarly, Fukuyama (1995) underlined the importance 
of trust between social groups or individuals in framing the corporate structure of an 
economy and in generating the conditions for sustained growth by lowering transaction 
costs.
Knack and Keefer (1997) attempt to measure social capital, understood as trust, 
norms of civic cooperation and associations within groups. They proceed to show that 
their indices of trust and civic cooperation are important in explaining output growth.
Although major problems of definition and measurement remain (and axe unlikely 
ever to be resolved), a relative consensus on the importance of social capital for growth
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seems to have emerged. Trust, civic cooperation and a low degree of social fragmenta­
tion (along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines) are often pinpointed as major elements 
contributing to high social capital. Strong, stable and transparent political, judicial, 
legal and administrative institutions are also frequently highlighted as essential elements 
in establishing the conditions for sustained growth in developing countries.
Clearly, part of a country’s social capital pertains to ’’soft” cultural variables that are 
hard to define and quantify, and that are not accumulable in the traditional economic 
sense. Crucially, however, a significant part of the improvement in ’’trust” and the 
institutional framework requires real and measurable economic investments. Setting up 
an efficient and just judicial system could require, for example, increasing the number of 
judges, improved training, pay rises, computerization, etc. The same argument can be 
extended to the whole public administration.
Some social capital can thus be accumulated in a traditional economic sense by 
investment of real resources. The accumulation of the economically measurable portion 
of social capital is likely to be constrained by domestic saving, so that in most cases we 
will consider social capital as domestic capital.
Domestic capital should not be understood as pertaining only to human capital or the 
institutional framework. A significant portion of physical capital may also be considered 
as domestic capital. One typical example would consist of basic road and communication 
infrastructure. Foreigners may not be willing to finance such type of capital, either in 
the form of loans or direct investment, as the returns may not necessarily be financially 
appropriable, or at too high a cost. It must be recognized also that domestic investors 
may not be in a position to finance such projects. This would leave room for ’’useful 
government spending” , as modelled by Barro (1990), or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992b).
Certain types of physical capital that one would think of as intrinsically universal 
might also be restricted to domestic as a result of government regulations specific to each 
country. Public utilities in most developing countries were, until recently, considered as 
a sector without possible foreign intervention. Foreign direct investment was banned in 
many cases in the telecommunication, electricity or water sectors. External borrowing
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may also not have been possible for domestic companies operating in the sector, either 
as a result of direct government restrictions, or for other credit constraining reasons. 
These sectors are typical examples of how government policy may affect the definition 
of domestic and universal capital.
*
In recent years, governments in many emerging market economies have started to 
deregulate the public utilities and infrastructure sectors and have put in place privatiza­
tion programs together with the opening of these sectors to foreign investment. Examples 
abound throughout emerging markets and have affected telecommunication companies, 
the provision or even distribution of electric power, water and sewerage services, and the 
transportation sector. Toll roads, bridges or power plants axe increasingly financed by 
foreign investors through Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Operate-Own (BOO) 
schemes, which was unthinkable only a decade or so ago.
Separating the economy into a dual structure along domestic/universal lines seems 
empirically relevant. It also allows us to analyze formally the issue of convergence in 
an open economy context, to determine the factors that underpin the size and timing of 
capital flows, and to consider the impact of such flows on inequality.
Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) sought to explain why convergence across 
countries is not immediate in an open economy context and proceeded along somewhat 
similar lines as those developed above. They assume that output is a function of physical 
capital, human capital and raw labor. They proceed to show that if foreign borrowing is 
constrained by the need for collateral, and that if human capital cannot be used for that 
purpose, the economy exhibits convergence properties that are more similar to those of 
a closed economy than those obtained in a simple extension of the Solow neo-classical 
economy with perfect capital mobility.
The hypothesis that certain types of capital cannot be accumulated through capital 
flows from abroad is thus similar to Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin’s starting point, 
but the empirical rationale is somewhat different, and the key difference is tha t the 
economy is split in a dual, yet complementary, structure.
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3.3  T h e M od el
As explained above, we assume that the economy is dual in the sense that two broadly 
defined sectors coexist. This coexistence of a ’’domestic” and ’’universal” sector can also 
be thought of along the more usual lines of traditional vs. modern, informal vs. formal 
or non-tradable vs. tradable. They key assumption is that, in contrast to Kuznets, 
we postulate that the two sectors are not independent of each other. Specifically, we 
assume that output of the homogenous final good takes the form
Y  = A K S  ((1 -  v) i ) I_a] T [k S (vL J1- " ] 1 -7  (3.1)
where Kd is domestic capital, K u is universal capital, and v is a share of the labor 
force L.
The dynamic equations of the model are:
j  = n (3.2)
v <  1 — e~’,Kd (3.3)
Kd = h<d -  SKd (3.4)
K u = IKu ~ SKn (3.5)
where Ik x is the total investment in either type of capital.
The key element of the production function is that the two sectors are complementary 
in ’’output”, i.e. the combination of labor and capital used in each sector, and not 
just in the amount of raw capital. An economy with a well developed domestic sector 
provides a favorable environment for production in the universal sector, and vice versa. 
Empirically, an economy with a high level of basic education (abundant human capital), 
good basic transportation infrastructure and an efficient administration (lack of red tape, 
clear rules and foreseeable decisions, etc.) offers good conditions for a multinational to 
set up operations. Similarly, a country with a well developed universal sector (good 
telecommunication and international transportation infrastructures, good financial sector
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and well developed banks, etc.) offers a favorable environment to the domestic sector.
We also assume, critically, that v  is constrained in this economy: the ’’social planner” 
chooses v  optimally, under the constraint that v < 1 — e~1)Kd. In other words, the 
economy is constrained by the fact that only a fraction of the labor force is qualified, at 
any given time, to work in the universal sector:- The rationale for this assumption is 
that the universal sector employs more qualified people, who need a minimum amount of 
training. We assume that v increases with domestic capital: richer and more developed 
countries have better educational systems that allow them to train the vast majority 
of the population. As Kd tends to infinity, the constraint is no longer binding as it 
converges to v < l 2. Any cumulative distribution function could be used instead of the 
exponential function used here. Each specific functional form would yield to specific 
speeds and paths of convergence, but would not affect the main results.
We consider a representative agent who maximizes dynastic utility and has a CES 
utility function:
fi\-6  _  i
U(C) = - ~ ~ r  (3.6)
3.3.1 T he  U nconstrained  Closed Economy
We first solve the model for a closed economy that faces no constraint on v. This is 
useful to derive the benchmark from which deviations from optimality will be compared. 
Although we consider a closed economy, we preserve the distinction between Kd and 
K u, and capital decisions are not reversible. Without any loss of generality, we ignore 
population growth and technological progress. The social planner optimizes as follows:
M ax
o
subject to:
'Obviously, we always Jiave v  G [0,1].
o o
/ r^ l—6' ~Pldt (3.7)1 - 0
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y = A [ K % ( ( l - v ) L ) l- a\ [ K P { v L ? -  
k d =  IKd -  SKd 
K u =  Y  — C — IKd ~ 8KU 
lKd > 0 
I k * >  0
1 -7
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)
(3.12)
Optimization over the choice variables C , v (the share of total labor L  allocated to 
the universal sector), and 7/q yields the following conditions:
C~de~pt =
PS
7 - 1
A 7 [ K S ( ( l - v ) L ) 1~a]
[(1 -  a) KS-((1- » ) £ ) - “ (-£ )]  
+ A ( l - i )  
[ j fJ ( ( l-v )L )1-'-n
_ 7  [ if f  ( 1 - /3 ) ( v L y ^ L j  _
|7 - 1
7^ fc((i-»)i)1_a|-AS + f i i  r , r J .,
[a X f - 1 ((1  -  v) L)x- “] [Kg (t-L)1" '5]
1 - 7
P
A(l-7 )[l£?((l-®)L) l - a ] 7
K g ( v L f - ^ Y ' '  [/3-ftf- 1  (vL)1^ ]  -  S
P
> =  o
A = P
-A
=  ~P
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
Equation (3.14) is the constraint on the marginal productivity of labor. Because 
we assume for the time being that labor is not differentiated and fully mobile across 
sectors, the marginal productivities of labor in the two sectors must be equal at all 
times: =  q[(i - v)l\ • Equation (3.14) implies that v01*, the optimal fraction of total
labor employed in the universal sector, is a constant.
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v opt (1 — 7 ) (1 — 0)
1 — (3 (1 — 7) — cry (3.18)
One should note, in particular, that vopt does not depend on the amount of domestic 
or universal capital. It is permanently at its steady-state value, which depends exclu­
sively on the parameters of the model, i.e. the relative size of the domestic sector, 7 , 
and the capital intensities of the domestic and universal sectors, a  and /?, respectively.
Using equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), we see that the second optimization condi­
tion requires that the marginal productivities of domestic and universal capital be equal: 
~  ^he optimal ratio of domestic to universal capital is thus a constant as
well:
In order to ensure that this condition holds at all times, we would need to assume 
reversibility of investment decisions, which we wish to avoid. Equation (3.19) would 
hold if initial conditions are such that ^  tha t were not the case, the
transition dynamics would be such tha t either lK d =  0  (if 7^ 5  ^ >  fi(f2;7)), or Ik u =  0  
(if ^ [ 0  ^ < ) m a first phase, before turning positive again. This is not an
important consideration here, however, and we can simply assume that initial conditions 
are such that equation (3.19) holds at t  =  0 and that there are no subsequent exogenous 
disturbances (wars, ...) so tha t it holds at all times.
The influence of the parameters on the steady state values of v0^ 1 and is easily 
determined:
m d( Kd/ K u) _  >  0 . The parameter 7  g]0, 1[ is used in this model as an
indicator of the relative size of the domestic sector. A larger value of 7 , for 
given capital intensities a  and /3, implies a larger optimal value of domestic capital 
relative to universal capital, which one would expect if the domestic sector is large 
relative to the universal sector.
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• > 0  and < 0. A relatively large capital
intensity in any of the two sectors implies a relatively large optimal value of the 
respective capital stock. In particular, if the universal sector is relatively intensive 
in capital, a more important fraction of the total capital stock of the economy 
K  =  Kd +  K u is allocated to that sector at any given time and for a given value of 
the size indicator 7 .
• =  ~(7-^+ 7/3_q7)2 <  0 - This confirms that the parameter 7  is used as the
relative size indicators: a larger value of 7  implies, ceteris paribus, that a higher 
proportion of the labor force is employed in the domestic sector, which one would 
expect if the domestic sector is large.
•  ^  (1 — 0)  (1 -  7) >  0 and ^  <  0. A higher
capital intensity in any sector implies, ceteris paribus, that a lower proportion of 
the labor force is employed in that sector.
Equations (3.13) and (3.16) yield the usual dynamic equation for consumption:
C = 1 I  A7 [Ad“ ( ( l - ^ ‘) L)1_Q] 
c  e \  \k £
a K ^ - 1 ((I -  v°Pt) L )1 Q1 
^ - 7  „
- 6 - p
(3.20)
Given that ^  is constant, we can deduct also that = - Constant pro­
portions of total investment / =  Ij<d +  Ik u = Y  — C  are thus devoted to each of the 
two sectors3. This means that the dynamics of the economy can be fully described by 
analyzing the dynamics of C  and Kd (or K u). Agents optimally choose the level of 
consumption given the initial condition on the total level of capital K  present in the 
economy. For any given level K-, equation (3.19) and K — Kd +  K u determine a unique 
optimal allocation (K d,K u). We can thus express the production function in terms of 
Kd, and L  only, as v is also a constant (function of the parameters of the model).
3The domestic sector receives a share ~7) of total investment.
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1 - 7
Y dosed = [((1 -  L )1-"]"' |  0 (3.21)
Since we assumed L to be constant, we have
yclosed =  A Qjftr«7+^(1-7) =  f  ^  ^ 2 )
where f2 =  j^((l — vopl') L ) 1 aj |  [^ 07^  (v ^ L ) 1 is a positive constant.
We can easily see that 0 < cry 4 - (3 (1 — 7 ) < 1  because we assume 0 < a  <  1, 0 <  /3 <  1 
and 0 < 7  <  1. The expression is thus a weighted average of two parameters included 
between zero and one. This demonstrates that the marginal productivity of Kd is 
positive but decreasing in Kd4-
The dynamics of Kd is derived from:
Kd =  IKd- S K d (3.23)
(3.24)
(3.25)
iK t + I x .  =  }{K d) - C  .
Ikj on
I k„ 0 (1 - 7 )
Prom these three equations, we have that,
kd  =  W + 7 & - T ) [/ (Kd) (3-26)
The dynamic equation for consumption can also be written more succinctly as,
% =  \  { [“ 7  +  0  (1 -  7 )] -  6 - p \  (3.27)
These two equations fully describe the dynamic properties of the closed economy with 
domestic and universal capital. It does not differ fundamentally in terms of dynamics
4/ '  ( K d) >  0  and /"  (K d) <  0  because 0 7  +  (3 (1  — 7 ) — 1 <  0
and steady state properties from the traditional Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy. In 
particular, there is a unique steady state CSSA, K j SA and the economy has saddle path 
stability. Because we assumed no population growth and did not consider technological 
progress, this economy reaches a steady state with zero nominal growth. Introducing 
steady state growth in per capita variables is obtained straightforwardly by assuming 
technological progress as in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model.
The steady state values of consumption and domestic capital (and consequently also 
universal capital) are as follows (where SSA denotes steady state autarchy equilibrium):
iSSA  _=  m f A) -
(* 1  + (3(1 - 7 )
cry 6K2sa
j^SSA a'y 4- (3 (1  -  7 )
6 + p AQ
l - a - y - / 3 ( l — r)
(3.28)
(3.29)
where 1 — cry — (3 (1 — 7 ) > 0.
3.3.2 T he C onstrained Closed Econom y
We now consider the case of a closed economy that faces a  binding constraint on v, that 
is an economy for which initial conditions are such that 1 — < v0?1. One would
obviously expect the economy to cease being constrained on its allocation of labor to the 
universal sector at some point as v is an increasing function of Kd- In the early stages 
of development, however, the economy is constrained to set v =  1 e~r]Kd < v01*.
Optimization over the choice variables C  and /# .  yields the following conditions:
C -»e- pt =  f! (3.30)
A =  fi (3.31)
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>47 [f f j ( e - ^ L ) 1 - " ] 7 -1  
a i f j ' 1 [e~nKdL)l a +  (1 -  a)
K% (e-'>KdL y a ( - T j e - ^ i )
-A<5 + M <! [ i f £ ( ( l - e - ’'Ar-)L )1_/?] 1“7 +
> 4 (1 -7 )  [ ^ ( e - ^ Z , ) 1- 0] 7 
K% ((1 -  e-'>K“) i ) 1_P] ”7 
[(1 ~ / 3 ) k S ((1 -  e~’,K,‘) L)~0 (77e - i ^ L ) }
> 4 (1 -7 )  [K S{e-’>K'‘L)I- aY  
M< [ i s f ( ( l - e - ’'/f-)L )1_<3]“7 
[ /3 ^ _1 ((1 -  e - i ^ )  -  S
= - A (3.32)
=  - f i  (3.33)
Optimization again requires that the marginal returns on each type of capital be 
equalized. Using equations (3.31), (3.32) and (3.33) we obtain that
K u = (3 (1 ~  7) K i (3.34)
As in the previous section, this condition could hold at all times with certainty 
only if we assumed that capital decisions are reversible. We again wish to avoid that 
assumption, but assume instead that initial conditions are such that equation (3.34) is 
respected and that there are no subsequent exogenous shocks to disturb it, so that it also 
holds at all times. Again, assuming initial conditions where equation (3.34) does not 
hold simply means that investment is temporarily directed only to one type of capital, 
which is unimportant here.
The term cry in the denominator is the ” optimality” term, as it is equal to the 
denominator term in equation (3.19), which determines the unconstrained optimal level 
of K u for any level of Kd- The second term in the denominator is a ’’distortion from 
optimality” term. It reflects the impossibility for the constrained economy to be on the 
first best convergence path. It is easy to verify that is positive
for values of Kd below a critical level K® for which the term equals to zero. The 
function is indeed equal to infinity for Kd = 0 , and is continuous and everywhere
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decreasing in K d- There exists thus a unique level K g  for which >
i.e. a unique level from which the constrained economy rejoins the optimal convergence 
path. This level is given by,
k S i l n
V 7 ( 1 - a )
(3.35)
It is obvious also that,
v °  = 1 -  = v0** = . ( I - 7 )  (1 - / 3) (1 - 7 ) (1 - / 3)
(1 -  7) (1 -  /?) +  7  (1 -  a )  1 -  P (1 -  7 ) -  <*7 (3.36)
The distortion from optimality term is necessarily equal to zero at the level where 
the optimal v is attained. For any level v >  t/**, the constraint is no longer binding, 
and a fraction v°^  of the labor force operates in the universal sector.
From this, we can conclude that VKd < K g  : K ? natrained < K ^nconstrained, and
K u = t a r t+ r )K d
e 7(1—a)
\ - e —nK d  ( 1 - 7 ) ( 1 - ^ )
K d \/Kd < K $  
VKd > K 9
(3.37)
We can substitute this expression for K u in the production function again, and obtain 
that,
Y  closed/ constrained h (K d) VKd < K $  
f ( K d) VKd > K °
where h (Kd) < f  (Kd) for K d < K °  and h (Kd) = f  (Kd) for K d > K%.
(3.38)
We can now show that wage in the universal sector is higher than in the domestic 
sector VKd < K g . The marginal productivities of labor in each sector are given by:
=  i l ( l - 7 ) [ A ? ( ( l - « ; ) L ) 1- “ ] 7 (3.39)
[k £ {vL )1^ ]  [(1 -  0) K% (v L )-f\
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B Y  1*7—1
=  ^ [ * ? ( ( i - ) £ ) 1- a] (3.40)
[(1  -  a )K S  ( (1  -  v) i ) - “] [Kg («L) ' - ^ ] 1 -7
Comparing with q^ i I v^  is equivalent, after simplification, to comparing
with j-z^. It is easy to see that is everywhere increasing in v  (in the restricted do­
main 0 <  v < 1) and is equal to zero for v  =  0. By definition also, for
v0?1, which is unique. As a result, we have thus that >  y^j for any Kd < K ° ,
and for any Kd > K®. This implies that the wage differential between
the universal and domestic sectors is given by
d Y  dY
d{vL) d [ ( l  — v)L]
Y [ (i-/3)(i-7 ) _  ji-zsh] \/Kd < K ?
l v ^  J d < d (3.41)
0 VXd > K °
where >  0 when K d < K $ , which implies a positive wage differ­
ential between the universal and domestic sectors in the constrained economy. Let us 
denote the wage differential by A^. Because v  and K u are functions oi Kd, the wage 
differential is a function of K d and the parameters of the model.
d Y  9 Y  = A W = A  w (Kd) (3.42)
d (vL) d  [(1 — v) L]
  i i ~r .. „•__  l— _
d&T)The total wage bill in this economy, for any level of v, is given by
d[(i-v)L] (1 ~  v) L. The average wage w  is thus equal to
w=  [(1 -  7 ) (1  -  0) +  7  (1 -  a)] j -  (3.43)
The average wage is a constant share of output per worker, where the share is the 
sector-weighted average of the labor shares (1 — a) and (1 — (3). It is easy also to see 
that the wage rates in the domestic and universal sectors can be expressed as,
» * . -  ' ■ <»■«>
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(3.45)
In the unconstrained economy, where v =  it is straightforward to observe that 
u>Kd — wku =w- In the constrained economy where v < v0?1, the terms and
(1~7y ~ /3) increase and fall, respectively, as the economy develops (as Kd increases). 
This implies that the wage differential in the constrained economy is a monotonically 
decreasing function of Kd- This result is in sharp contrast to Kuznets’ hypothesis 
that inequality increases in the first phases of development. We can see here that 
allowing for interactions between the two sectors of the economy is sufficient to generate 
a continuously decreasing level of inequality, which eventually converges to  zero.
Equation (3.41) represents the absolute wage differential is this economy. We can also 
derive a relative differential, a more useful measure of inequality. The wage differential 
as a percentage of wage in the domestic sector (the low-paid sector) is given by,
=  Vm (Kd) =  _  1 (3.46)
w Kd V ( l-a)7
For any given Kd < K ^ ,  we have thus that the relative wage differential is influenced 
as follows by the parameters of the model:
•  e <  o. The larger the size of the universal sector (the lowerl - o h  v
avt _  _
dl [(1 0 )7]'-
7 ), the larger the relative wage differential, for any given value of Kd-
 -  7 (1—ff)(i-7) 1-y >  o av^ _  - 7 ( i-7)(i-q) hzv /  0  The lartrer the
da -  [(l-a)7]a v w  ~  [(1—0 )7] v g
capital share in the domestic sector, the larger the relative wage differential, and 
the larger the capital share in the universal sector, the lower the relative wage 
differential.
The dynamic evolution of the wage differential is similar even if initial conditions 
are such that equation (3.34) is not respected. If we assume that initial conditions 
are such that there is ’’excess” K u, all investment will initially be directed towards the 
accumulation of Kd- As long as we assume that Kd(0) < we have a positive wage 
differential. Because all investment is directed to increasing Kd in a first phase, however,
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the wage differential falls faster than when investment is directed to the accumulation of 
both types of capital. As soon as equation (3.34) holds again, the speed of convergence 
of wages returns to the normal case.
The dynamic properties of this constrained economy can be fully described in the 
(c, Kd) space by using equation (3.37), which allows us to obtain a production function 
in terms of Kd only. The constrained economy converges towards the optimal path 
of the unconstrained economy as Kd —*• K ° .  Once this point is reached, the steady- 
state is reached along a path where wages in the two sectors of the economy are equal, 
and where a constant fraction of total saving is invested in each type of capital. One 
should note that the constrained economy eventually reaches the same steady-state as 
the unconstrained economy.
3.3.3 T he U nconstrained  O pen Econom y
We now look at an economy that is open to  capital flows, as far as universal capital is 
concerned. To begin with, we return to the case where the economy faces no constraint 
on the allocation of labor across sectors, v. We effectively consider the unconstrained 
closed economy and analyze the consequences of allowing full mobility of universal cap­
ital. In other words, we consider the effects of opening the economy to world financial 
markets. This allows us to first analyze the determinants of capital flows, before looking 
at their effects on wage inequality in a constrained economy in the following sub-section.
Optimal allocation of labor across the two sectors still requires that the marginal 
products be equalized. As a result, we obtain the same condition on v as in the closed 
economy:
y 0 p t  =  ( V n ) ( \ ~ ^  ( 3 -4 7 )1 — p  (1 — 7 ) — OTf
While optimization also required the equalization of marginal returns on the two 
types of capital in the closed economy, full mobility of universal capital now imposes by 
arbitrage that the net marginal return on universal capital be equal at all times to the 
world interest rate:
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= .4 (1 -  7) [KS ((1 -  v) L)'-“]7 \k ? (kL)1^ ]  7 (3.48)
[ p K t 1 ( v l ) 1^ }
— Tv) S
By assuming full mobility of universal capital and a small open economy, the variable 
K u effectively ceases to be a state variable. Equation (3.48), the arbitrage condition, 
does not describe a linear relation between universal and domestic capital: the ratio ^  
is no longer a constant as in the unconstrained closed economy. The level of universal 
capital in the economy, nevertheless, is a function solely of the level of domestic capital, 
the parameters and the world interest rate.
K u =
rw + 8
1 -w -r) . . . ilr_glQ=.Tf( v ^ L )  (3 .4 9 )
We can see that \I> is positive and 1 — /? (1 — 7 ) >  0 for all acceptable values of the 
parameters. From equation (3.49) we can see that, ceteris paribus:
• an increase in the world interest rate reduces the level of universal capital in the 
economy. If we associate changes in the level of universal capital in the economy 
to capital flows5, we have thus that an increase in world interest rate would reduce, 
ceteris paribus, the level of universal capital from its previous arbitraged level and 
hence generate an outflow of capital.
• the level of domestic capital in the economy determines the arbitraged level of uni­
versal capital. Even more importantly, the rate of increase in domestic capital
5 We cannot a priori consider changes in the level of universal capital as equal to capital flows, because 
universal capital can also be accumulated through domestic saving. Capital flows, on the other hand, 
do translate one for one into changes in the level of universal capital.
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determines the rate of increase in the arbitraged level of universal capita, which 
we still somewhat loosely identify with capital flows. In other words, an economy 
that accumulates domestic capital rapidly will attract more capital flows than a 
similar economy whose domestic capital grows more slowly.
•  an increase in population size generates an increase in the level of universal capital. 
Similarly, an economy with a rapidly growing population will experience, ceteris 
paribus, a higher rate of increase in universal capital (more capital flows). The 
impact of the technology parameter A is identical.
It is again possible to express the production function in terms of Kd only as v0^ 1 is
. _ aTL- .
a constant and as we ignore population growth. Substituting K u =  in the
production function, we obtain,
yopen =  _  „opt) “j 7  j^/J W*1 ^  = g (Kd) (3.50)
It is easy to show again that 0 <  <  1, so that cf (Kd) > 0 and g" (Kd) <  0.
Using the equations relating universal capital to domestic capital in the closed and 
in the open economy, we can carry out a comparative analysis of the two economies and 
analyze the impact of opening an economy to capital flows. We have seen that:
Kdoied =  —— K d (3.51)
0:7
K c p e n  =  ( 3 5 2 )
where ^  is a positive constant dependent on L  and is likely to be large. Also, 
is expected to be small because one should reasonably assume that a  is close to /?, and 
7  (the relative size of the domestic sector) is unlikely to be close to zero. It is thus easy 
to graph the two equations relating K u to Kd-
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Figure 3.1: K u =  K u (Kd) in the open and closed economies
Arbitrage conditions ensure that the closed and the open economies are always on 
CL and on OP, respectively6. At all points of CL, we have that =  ■$%-. The OP 
curve, on the other hand, puts a restriction on the marginal return of universal capital 
only. At all points of OP, =  rw +  6. The two schedules cross only once because 
CL is linear while OP is concave and both cross the origin. At that point, the economy 
respects both arbitrage conditions and =  =  rw +  <$• This unique level of
domestic capital for which both conditions holds can be solved explicitly by using the 
fact that at that point,
-  W ^ i )  (3'53)
=  rm + 6 (3.54)d Y  dK d
Y  =  A Q K ri+ni- 'l) (3.55)
We have thus that K f ,  the level at which the net marginal returns on domestic 
capital and universal capital are both equal to the world interest rate is given by,
6 The closed economy could be away from CL for some part of the transition process if the initial 
conditions are such that ^  p(il-y) • This is of little interest here, however.
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E f  AQ. [cry +  /? (1 -  7 )] 1 i-«7- « i - 7)
K* ~  1 -------- t~ + 6 -------- /
(3.56)
Since 1 — cry — /? (1 — 7 ) is positive, < 0 . A lower world interest rate implies, 
ceteris paribus, a higher level of FfJ', at which CL and OP coincide. This result is 
quite intuitive, as it simply states that when the world interest rate is low, the level of 
domestic capital in the economy must be large in order to have the net marginal return 
to either type of capital equal to the world interest rate. As a consequence of decreasing 
marginal returns, the net marginal return to Kd (or K u) in the closed economy is higher 
than the world interest rate for any Kd < K ^ ,  and lower than the world interest rate 
for any Kd > K ^ .
Consider now the dynamics of a closed economy. Assume that the economy has 
a steady state at ( K fSA,K ^ SA) and that K f SA < K%. It follows that the autarchy 
level of interest rate is higher than the world interest rate. Given initial conditions 
[Kd (0), K u (0)] (assumed to be on CL), the economy will move to its steady state along 
the CL schedule.
Ku
CL
sso
OP
SSA
Kd
SSOSSA
Kd
Kd(0)
Kd Kd
Figure 3.2: Steady-states in open and closed economies
Consider then the impact of opening this economy, starting from the same initial 
conditions, where K d(0) <  K f .  At such a point, -^2 \K = ^KZ\k  > rw + 8.
Opening the economy to foreign capital at such a point results in an immediate inflow of
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universal capital as a consequence of arbitrage by non residents. The level of domestic 
capital, on the other hand, remains constrained as a state variable and cannot increase 
instantly. As a result, the opening of the economy generates an equalization between 
the net marginal return on universal capital and the world interest rate, and an increase 
in the marginal return on domestic capital. Graphically, the economy instantly moves 
from a point on the CL schedule to a point on the OP schedule with unchanged domestic 
capital and higher universal capital.
The economy will now move to its steady state along the OP schedule. One key 
difference with the closed economy is that the marginal return to domestic capital is 
higher than the marginal return to universal capital on all points above CL. Because 
residents have the option to invest in either type of capital, optimization requires the 
entire pool of domestic saving to be allocated to increases in domestic capital. On all 
points to the left of K ^ ,  the dynamic equation for Kd is thus,
k ° f en = g (K i ) - C - S K i  (3.57)
while in the closed economy, the dynamic equation for Kd was given by,
= [ f  {Kd) ~ c ] ~ 6Kd  (3-58)
We know that for any Kd < K f , the level of universal capital in the open economy 
is higher than in the closed economy. Consequently, g(Kd) > f(K d ),  and g' (Kd) >
f  (Kd). For any Kd > K j ,  on the other hand, the level of universal capital in the
closed economy is lower than in the closed economy, and as a result, g (Kd) < 
and gf (Kd) < f  (Kd). From this, we can conclude that for all points to the left of K ^ ,
^ o p e n  >  J^dosed  ( 3 . 5 9 )
, . . open , . x dosed
§ )  =  \  W ( K i ) - 6 - p ] > \ ± \  = l l f ( K d) - 6 - p ]  (3.60)
The opening of the economy to foreign capital increases the speed of convergence
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for any economy that starts from initial condition Kd (0) <  K f . The convergence to 
the steady state is not immediate as in the basic open economy Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans 
model, however. The economy moves progressively towards its steady state, as the entire 
pool of domestic saving is allocated to increases in domestic capital. Such increases in 
domestic capital, in turn, generate increases in universal capital, which, in this case, will 
be entirely financed by inflows from abroad, which means that we can equate changes in 
universal capital to foreign capital flows. All along the transition path to steady state, 
we also see that output in the open economy is higher than output in the closed economy 
(for a given level of Kd).
In the graph above, we assumed that the autarchy steady-state interest rate was 
above the world interest rate, i.e. that the home economy is more impatient than the 
rest of the world. In such a case, the unconstrained open economy reaches a new steady- 
state with K j SO > K%sa . It is not necessarily the case, however, that K ^ so  =  K f ,  
which means that there could coexist two interest rates in the steady-state economy, 
with the return on domestic capital being permanently higher than the return on world 
markets.
The reverse situation, where the home economy is more patient than the rest of the 
world can also be envisaged. In such a case, opening the economy actually implies an 
immediate outflow of universal capital and a gradual fall in domestic capital through 
zero investment and depreciation. The open-economy steady-state would thus imply 
lower levels of capital.
If we rule out differences in time preferences between home agents and foreign agents, 
on the other hand, we have that K%so  =  K f .  In such a case, opening the economy to 
foreign capital does not affect steady-state values of capital and output, and domestic 
and world interest rates are equalized, but convergence to steady-state is faster.
A few key results emerge from this analysis. We have seen that convergence is 
faster in the open economy than in the closed economy, but that it is not immediate, as 
predicted by the simple extension of the Solow model. While an immediate inflow of 
capital follows the opening of the economy, the accumulation of domestic capital is what
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determines subsequent inflows. That is, domestic investment (i.e. domestic saving) 
is key in attracting foreign flows: capital attracts capital, "rich” countries may attract 
more capital flows than "poor” countries. The factors that determine the speed of 
convergence are thus essentially domestic, even in the open economy setting.
3.3.4 T he  C onstrained  O pen Econom y
In this section, we analyze the effect of allowing perfect international mobility of universal 
capital when the economy faces a constraint on v, i.e. when Kd < K ° .  We shall also 
assume that K® <  K f  always holds, which means that the economy is constrained 
initially, but that it reaches the optimal convergence path before it reaches steady-state. 
The corollary to this is that the economy is always fully optimizing in steady-state.
Opening the constrained economy to flows of universal capital implies by arbitrage 
that the net marginal return to universal capital is always equal to the world interest 
rate:
A (1 - 7 ) [ l f j ( ( l - t > )£ ) 1~ “ ] 7  [ p u t 1 = r w + 6 (3.61)
We can express K u as a function of Kd as in equation (3.49), with the difference that 
v is no longer a constant:
K u = A/3 (1 -  7 )
f'w "i” &
l - / » ( l - 7 )  ,  ( l - / ? ) ( l - 7 )
(vL) (3.62)
[(1 -  v) L] A <i-7) K j = ^
ai
l - / ? ( l - 7 )
where 4/ (v) is an increasing function of v between [0 , v0?1] , which means tha t 4/ (v ) <  
^  (v°Pty) V v < v°pK
From this expression, we see that the arbitraged level of universal capital in the 
economy is constrained directly by the complementarity between the domestic and the
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universal sectors, but also by the share of the population that is able to work in the 
universal sector.
Because (v) <  (yopt) V v < 'uopt, the level of universal capital in the constrained 
open economy is lower than in the unconstrained open economy V Kd < K®. Once the 
economy reaches the point where Kd > K®, the constrained open economy rejoins the 
convergence path of the unconstrained open economy. The behavior of capital flows is 
thus equivalent in the two cases, with the difference that the constraint on labor mobility 
does not allow for as large an initial increase in universal capital. Also, capital inflows 
are smaller in the constrained open economy as long as the level of domestic capital is 
not high enough to allow for the optimal share of the labor force to work in the universal 
sector.
Substituting the expression for K u in the production function, we obtain that,
Y open/con stra ined J ^ (^ <0 ^ K d  < K ^
\  g (K d) VKd > K °
where j  (Kd) < g (Kd) for K d < K d and j  (Kd) =  g (Kd) for K d > K f .  The only 
difference between j  (Kd) and g (Kd) is that the term (v) is a constant in g (Kd) and 
is an increasing function in j  (Kd). The relation between Kd and K u in the four cases 
analyzed is represented graphically as follows.
▲ Ku
OP
OPC
CL
CLC
KdKd
Figure 3.3: Convergence paths in open and closed economies
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The labor mobility constraint added in this section means that the level of universal 
capital in the economy, for any given level of domestic capital, is lower than in the 
unconstrained open economy. If we assume that Kd (0) <  K °  < K f  , opening the 
constrained closed economy implies by arbitrage an initial jump in the level of universal 
capital in the economy, like in the unconstrained case. This jump is limited, however, by 
the availability of labor in the universal sector. Because of our assumptions, all domestic 
saving is devoted to the accumulation of domestic capital once the economy is opened 
to capital flows. This allows the constrained open economy to converge towards steady 
state along the OPC schedule, instead of the CLC schedule. As in the unconstrained 
case, opening the economy allows a faster process of convergence, but does not affect 
the steady state if we assume that domestic agents have the same preferences as foreign 
agents. Also, because we assumed that K® < the constrained economy reaches 
the same convergence path as the unconstrained economy before it reaches steady state.
The main effect of opening the economy on the pattern of convergence is thus es­
sentially the same in the constrained economy as in the unconstrained economy. The 
constrained economy, however, benefits even more from the opening to capital flows. 
The process of convergence is indeed doubly affected as being able to devote the entire 
pool of saving to the accumulation of domestic capital allows not only a faster accu­
mulation of domestic capital itself, but it also allows the economy to reach an optimal 
allocation of the labor force between sectors at an earlier stage.
The impact of opening the constrained economy on the wage differential is easy to 
determine. Prom equation (3.41), we see that the absolute wage differential actually 
increases at the time the economy is opened to inflows of universal capital. This is 
obvious from the expression, as output is increased as a consequence of the initial jump 
in universal capital and v is initially unaffected. This means that in absolute term, 
the ’’rich” see' their wage increase by a larger amount than the poor, which may be 
undesirable, either from a social justice perspective, or even from a growth perspective. 
One should note, however, that the ’’poor” also see their absolute wage increase, albeit 
by a smaller amount. It is thus not a case of one group gaining at the expense of the 
other: opening the economy has favorable effects on both groups.
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It is also easy to see from equation (3.46) that there is no initial effect on the relative 
wage differential. This should be obvious as opening the economy has no immediate 
effect on v. In fact, the larger absolute wage increase for the ’’rich” is such th a t the 
wage of the poor remains initially at the same percentage of the ’’rich” wage. This result 
is rather counter-intuitive as we would expect that a higher level of universal capital, 
for a given labor force operating in the sector and for a given level of domestic capital, 
increases the marginal productivity of labor in the universal sector relatively more than 
in the domestic sector. This is not the case here however, because the two sectors are 
complementary in ’’output” . This complementarity allows both groups to gain as much 
in relative terms from the opening of the economy to capital flows.
While opening the economy has no immediate effect on the relative wage distribution 
in the economy, the ’’poor” benefit doubly. First, their absolute wage is increased. Sec­
ond, and probably more importantly, the opening of the economy to inflows of universal 
capital allows a faster increase in v, which means that the wage differential is reduced 
more rapidly. In other words, opening the economy allows to reach a more even (exactly 
even in this simplified case) distribution of income faster.
This simple modeling tool thus shows that relative inequality is not immediately 
affected by the opening of the economy to capital flows. In fact, the poor gain in 
absolute terms as well as the rich. Beyond the immediate impact, capital flows allow 
inequality to fall faster. The poor benefit not only from the economy converging faster 
to a higher level of output, but also from the wage differential with the rich falling more 
rapidly.
3 .4  C on clu sion
A straightforward extension of the Solow-Cass-Koopmans growth model allowed us to 
obtain several new results on inequality and development and to reach important policy 
conclusions. In the first place, elaborating on Kuznets’ perception of a dual economy to 
allow for interactions between sectors shows that inequality is likely to decline monotoni- 
cally with development, instead of exhibiting an inverted U curve behavior. Importantly, 
we show that inequality can arise in a closed economy if labor is not fully mobile, even
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though capital can move freely between the two sectors. Capital mobility is thus not 
sufficient to ensure the equalization of marginal returns to labor.
A second important result that emerges from the model is that convergence is not 
immediate in the open-economy extension of the Solow-Cass-Koopmans growth model. 
The speed of convergence is driven mostly by domestic factors, including time preferences 
and the rate of domestic saving. The size and timing of capital flows from abroad, aside 
from being affected by the world interest rate, are thus determined by domestic factors.
Given the complementarity between the two sectors of the economy, we have seen 
that countries with a well developed domestic sector (capital rich countries) are those 
that are bound to attract large capital flows from abroad. Similarly, countries that 
accumulate domestic capital at a fast pace, i.e. countries with high domestic investment 
(high domestic saving), sire those that attract large capital flows. In other words, capital 
attracts capital: one only lends to the rich.
This may explain why, contrary to the simple prediction of the standard open econ­
omy growth model, "capital rich” countries in South-East Asia, for example, have consis­
tently attracted more capital flows from abroad than "capital poor” and labor abundant 
economies elsewhere in Asia, Africa or Latin America. This highlights the importance 
of domestic investment and domestic saving in a country’s process of convergence and 
questions the unrealistic hopes some put into free movements of capital flows to  boost 
investment and raise the speed of convergence. Capital flows certainly contribute to 
faster convergence, but their contribution is limited and determined by domestic factors.
The model may thus shed some additional light on the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. 
One would in fact expect, particularly if 7  (the relative size of the domestic sector) 
is large, total investment to be significantly correlated with domestic saving, even if 
there is perfect mobility of universal capital. While capital flows allow the economy to 
invest more than it saves in aggregate, these flows are in fact determined by the extent to 
which domestic capital grows, i.e. by the size of domestic saving. Aggregate investment, 
and even investment in universal capital alone (or capital flows) are thus bound to be 
significantly correlated with domestic investment.
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The main policy conclusion of this chapter is that, just like Dollar and Kraay (2000) 
stated that ’’growth is good for the poor” , we affirm that ’’capital flows are good for 
the poor” . Capital flows are good in several ways. To begin with, we saw that 
opening the economy does not increase relative inequality. While the rich -operating 
in the universal sector and with higher wages- gain more in absolute terms than the 
poor -operating in the domestic sector- because capital flows are concentrated on the 
universal sector, the poor are not worse off in relative terms. Most importantly, they gain 
in absolute terms from the inflow of capital into the universal sector as a consequence 
of the complementarity between sectors. In other words, the poor also benefit from 
foreign investment in electricity generation or water supply systems, not only as a result 
of better services (not modeled here), but because it makes them more productive.
More importantly still, the model shows that, aside from the immediate gain from 
opening the economy, the poor stand to gain doubly from capital flows. On the one hand, 
they benefit because capital flows allow a faster reduction in wage inequality between 
the two sectors. On the other hand, they benefit because capital flows allow a faster 
convergence of the economy as a whole toward its (wealthier) steady-state. While they 
may not appear as the main beneficiaries of opening the economy because they do not 
operate in the sector receiving the flows of capital from abroad, the poor are thus the 
ones that stand to gain the most from free movement of capital.
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C hapter 4
Intersectoral Labor M obility, 
Equilibrium  Inequality and  
Growth
4.1  In tro d u ctio n
From Karl Marx to Ross Perot, people have feared that structural economic changes, 
whether due to capital accumulation, technological progress, comparative advantages 
or other causes would lead to an absolute loss in employment. Yet, Jacquard’s loom, 
the steam engine, chain work, the automation and computerization of all aspects of 
-economic- life or NAFTA have not generated massive net job destruction, and US un­
employment is at its lowest at a time of rapid technological change^ What has indeed 
happened, however, is that technological changes have caused a large, persistent and 
continuous reallocation of labor across sectors: new technologies have destroyed many 
of the early 20th century jobs, but have created many more new ones in a process of 
creative destruction.
The explanation of economic growth through purposeful R&D and creative destruc­
tion can be traced back at least to Schumpeter (1934). More recently, Aghion and 
Howitt (1992, 1998) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b) pioneered the formaliza­
tion of Schumpeter’s ideas in models of endogenous growth. Creative destruction, as
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presented in these models, can be assimilated to a purposeful Darwinian evolutionary 
process of survival of the fittest, where profit-driven agents seek the next evolutionary 
step. R&D allows companies to produce more efficiently and drive out competitors.
This process of creative destruction has been extensively studied as far as monopoly 
positions are concerned. Typically, a discovery allows a producer to enjoy a monopoly 
over a certain production process superior to that of all its competitors. This monop­
olistic position is later destroyed by somebody else’s discovery, which generates a yet 
superior production process.
The Schumpeterian growth literature has so far failed to analyze in detail the process 
of creative destruction as it applies to jobs, however. It has also little investigated the fact 
that new technologies require the labor force to adapt before they can be used effectively, 
and that this "adaptation process” may have an important impact on growth.
A very different strand of the literature has explored, mostly empirically, the effect 
on growth of the reallocation of labor across sectors. Kuznets (1955) presented some 
arguments as to how the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry may affect 
growth and inequality. Denison (1967) presented a more rigorous empirical analysis 
of the growth effect of labor reallocation from agriculture to industry in some western 
countries. Other studies, including Robinson (197.1) and Poirson (2000), have further 
investigated this issue.
This entire strand of the literature, however, has focused on the reallocation of la­
bor from agriculture to industry as a transitory phenomenon. Also, it usually merely 
postulates that labor productivity is higher in industry than agriculture, and fails to con­
sider general equilibrium effects of labor reallocation, in particular the effect on relative 
productivities in each sector.
This chapter proposes a refined version of the Schumpeterian model of endogenous 
growth that allows not only for creative destruction in monopolistic positions, but that 
also considers the causes and effects of creative destruction in jobs. Introducing a 
Darwinian process on jobs, we analyze cross-sectoral labor reallocation phenomena and 
their effects on growth and inequality. This allows us to propose a more satisfying
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approach to the ” labor reallocation effect.5’ literature in that the reallocation process 
becomes an endogenous equilibrium phenomenon and not just a transitory one, in tha t we 
allow for a multiplicity of sectors, and in that the source of labor productivity differentials 
is clearly explained.
Introducing frictions in the labor reallocation process, our approach also allows us, 
critically, to analyze the interactions between labor market rigidities, inequality and 
growth. New light is shed on the issue of inequality and growth. In particular, the 
model explicitly generates Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients as a function of a few core 
parameters.
4.2.1 Basic S tru c tu re
The core structure of the model is standard and builds on Aghion and Howitt (1992,
provide disutility. For simplicity, we assume that agents have linear intertemporal 
preferences:
over [0,1], each of which uses an intermediate good X{ in association with a mass L{ of
4 .2  T h e M od el
1998). Let the economy be populated by a continuous and constant mass L  of agents 
(normalized to 1) each endowed with one flow unit of labor, and where work does not
oo
0
which implies that r represents both the rate of time preference and the interest rate.
Output of the homogenous final good Y  is produced by a continuum of sectors indexed
the total labor force and a public good Gt that is subject to congestion effects. The 
production function for firm j  in sector i at time t takes the form
(4.2)
where An is the index summarizing technology of sector i at time t, n  is the total 
number of firms producing the final good, and where a +  (3 < 1. It is possible to
show that, under certain conditions, there is a unique, constant and strictly larger than 
1 number of firms that maximizes aggregate output in any sector i1. The production 
function for sector i can then be rewritten as
(4.3)
Assuming a continuum of sectors over [0,1] implies that
l
Yt =  I  Yitdi (4.4)
0
1
L — 1 — J  Ludi 
o
(4.5)
The key element of the production function is that labor is introduced as a comple­
mentary input to  the intermediate good X *, and that each sector employs only a partial 
mass Li of the total labor force. This divides the economy into independent sectors 
and captures the idea that workers, being a rival good, operate exclusively in one sec­
tor. Any worker is assumed to work with only one intermediate good, which is not 
fully realistic, but which better captures reality than the postulate that the entire labor 
force operates with the whole range of intermediate inputs, which is what is assumed in
l
models where the production function takes the form Yt =  L l~a f  A uX ^di, as in Barro
o
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or that workers are not used directly in the production of the 
final good, which is what Aghion and Howitt (1998) assume by using the production 
function Yit — AitX ft .
Having decreasing returns to scale in X  and L  (i.e. a  +  /? <  1) is essential to 
ensure that all sectors are used to produce the final good in equilibrium. This will be 
demonstrated later as a more complete justification of the assumption is provided.
The rest of the setting is traditional: final good producers operate in a competitive
^ e e  appendix 4A
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market, while the production of intermediate goods is subject to monopoly. Techno­
logical progress takes place at the level of the intermediate goods and is the result of 
purposeful R&D. The research effort is remunerated by a monopolistic position over 
the production of intermediate good X{ of a given vintage. Vintages are differentiated 
by the technology parameter An, with more recent vintages having a higher An. We 
assume that all intermediate goods, regardless of sector and vintage, axe produced at a 
unit cost in terms of final output Y .
Optimization by final good producers requires that
= aAitXST'L^Pjt (4.6)
= P A itX ^ L i-1 = wit (4.7)
where Pa is the price of intermediate good i at time t  and wu is the wage rate in 
sector i at time t.
Monopolists maximize profit: max [P (Xu) — 1] X u. The equilibrium level of inter­
mit
mediate good is thus given by
X i t = [ a 2Ait] ^  L j r  (4-8)
Given the demand function of final good producers, intermediate goods are all priced 
at a constant mark-up over marginal cost (itself equal to one for all sectors and at all 
times):
Pit = -  (4.9)a
4.2.2 R& D  Process and  Discoveries
The process of R&D and discovery is modeled in a standard way. There exists a 
distinct competitive R&D sector for each intermediate good. Discoveries follow a path- 
independent Poisson process with arrival rate A Rit t , where Rit is the amount of
vAMaxT^
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resources (in units of the final good) devoted to research in sector i at time t, A ^ ax is the 
highest level of technology attained in the economy (in any sector) and 0 < A < 1 and 
0 <  7] < 1 are parameters. An important assumption is that the probability of discovery 
in a  sector does not depend on the time elapsed since the last discovery, but only on the 
resources invested in R&D. This implies, together with the earlier assumptions on the 
sectoral production function, full symmetry across sectors.
Arrival rates across sectors, as explicited above, are fully independent of each other. 
We wish to allow for the presence of knowledge spillovers, however, meaning tha t dis­
covery in a sector affects other sectors by contributing to a global pool of knowledge.
The state of the global pool of knowledge is captured by the cutting-edge tech­
nology in the economy, i.e. the highest Ai at time t. Knowledge spillover is modeled 
by assuming that a discovery in any sector i at time t  allows the innovator to start pro­
ducing with technology parameter A ^ ax. Absent subsequent discovery, the technology 
remains constant thereafter, until a new discovery occurs at time t +  s, in which case the 
technology parameter jumps discretely from A f1^  to A f f f 0.
For simplicity, we assume that the parameters of the model are such that innovations 
axe drastic. In other words, innovations are such that an incumbent monopolist is 
always displaced when a discovery occurs in its sector, and the new monopolist applies 
full monopoly pricing.
The cutting-edge parameter A ^ ax itself is assumed to evolve proportionately to the
l
aggregate level of resources devoted to R&D. Let Rt =  j  Radi represent the aggregate
o
level of research in the economy. We assume that
A M ax  o
* =  A I n  7 ,  7 > 1  (4-10)
A f rjA
Two features of the discovery process need to be underlined. Firstly, In 7  must be 
thought of as a ’’size of innovations” parameter. It is a simple extension of the framework 
where discovery is assumed to make the technology parameter grow by a proportionality 
factor 7 . Say, for example, that there is only one sector, and that discovery means
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that At — 'yAt-i. In such a case, the technology parameter follows a step function 
with expected growth rate proportional to In 7 . In the current setting, the presence 
of a continuum of sectors in [0 , 1] ensures that the actual cutting-edge parameter grows 
smoothly, even though individual sectors’ technology parameters follow step functions.
Secondly, we have assumed that the Poisson arrival rate depends o n  —. An
increasing absolute amount of R&D effort is thus needed to keep the sectoral arrival rate 
(and the growth rate of the cutting-edge technology) constant. This assumption aims 
to capture the empirical observation that increasing resources are invested into R&D 
without noticeable accelerating effects on the speed of technological progress. It is also 
necessary to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path.
Technology parameters are distributed between 0 and A f10* at any given time t. 
Innovations imply that the distribution shifts rightward over time. Let us define the 
relative technology parameter in sector i at time t as,
Relative technology parameters are distributed over [0,1] and decrease continuously 
as long as no discovery occurs in a sector. If a discovery occurs, the technology parameter 
in that sector discretely jumps to A ^ ax, taking the relative parameter to 1 .
Having showed that the domain of relative parameters is constant, one can show that 
their distribution is also constant in the long run, the movement of one sector along the 
distribution always being compensated by the movement of other sectors. This can 
be proved by letting F  (A, t ) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of absolute 
technology parameters at any given time t. Noting that F  (A j^^O ) =  1 and that the 
density to the left of A qIox falls at a rate equal to dF A^^t—^  =  — F  (A g ^ jt )  ’I', where \I> 
is the Poisson arrival rate, we obtain a differential equation with given initial condition.
d A ^ ax  A/f RSolving the differential equation and using the fact that —^ — =  A ™0^ A ■ 1 ■ In 7 ,
vAm “I 13"
we obtain that the cdf of relative technology parameters is constant and given by2,
2 A more detailed proof can be found in appendix 4B and in Aghion and Howitt (1998), pp. 115-6.
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H  (a) = a ] n 1 (4 .12)
This property holds regardless of the initial condition on the distribution of the 
technology parameters. Although it holds only in the long run, we assume for simplicity 
that it also holds at time 0. One can see from, equation (4.12) that the shape of the 
distribution of relative parameters depends exclusively on In 7 , the size of innovations 
parameter. This parameter can be calibrated to fit some priors one may have on the 
structure of the economy. One could sensibly assume that a developing economy, say 
with larger potential for adaptations of existing foreign technologies, has a large 7 , while 
a more developed economy has less potential for very large innovations. Graphically, 
the distribution function is then represented as
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.4 0.6 0 80.2
Figure 4.1: H  (a) =  a ln '1 with 7  =  1.1 (dots), 7  =  1.3, and 7  =  5  (solid)
Large innovations generate a situation where sectors with low technology coexist with 
sectors with high technology to a much larger extent than if innovations are smaller. 
This may indeed fit the description of developing countries where modern high tech­
nology sectors coexist with traditional sectors to a larger extent than in industrialized 
countries. Although we will consider 7  as a fixed parameter throughout the model, the 
framework will allow us to consider what could happen if 7  was allowed to change over 
time. Even though it would be interesting to carry out, endogenizing 7  will be left for 
further research.
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4.2.3 Flexible A llocation of Labor Across Sectors
At this stage, we need to make assumptions about the mobility of labor across sectors. 
As a benchmark, we first analyze an economy where labor is fully and instantaneously 
mobile across sectors. At a later stage, we introduce rigidities in the allocation of labor, 
which allows us to derive the main results on equilibrium inequality and growth.
Sectoral Allocation of Labor
If labor is fully and instantaneously mobile across sectors, its marginal product is neces­
sarily equal across sectors and there is a single wage rate in the economy:
=  wt Vi, t (4.13)uLit
The ratio of the labor force allocated to any two sectors is thus given by ^  =
[ _ 1 _ o34^7 1 1-/? * Using the equilibrium condition for X n, this ratio is equal to
Ljt
~Ut
ljt
An
l - a - P
(4.14)
where > 1 by assumption.
Just as we defined the relative technology parameter an, we can define the relative 
labor share as the ratio of the labor force in sector i at time t  to the labor force in the 
sector with the highest technology parameter, L ^ ax. Let
=  i p ?  <4-15)
j^Max js unknown but constant at time t. The domain of the relative labor share 
is also [0,1]. Because equation (4.14) holds for any two sectors, it necessarily holds if
sector i is the highest technology sector at time t. This implies that In =  0,-13, i.e.
that the relative labor share of any sector is a function of the relative technology of that 
sector. Because In is a continuous transformation of the random variable an with cdf 
given by equation (4.12), we can derive the cdf of In as follows:
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H ( l )  =  l 1"7 (4.16)
While A ^ ax grows constantly, cannot grow without bounds. In particular,
l
we assumed that the total labor force L  is constant: L  =  1 =  f  Ludi. At any given
o
l
time t , L ^ ax is a constant. It follows then that L^ ax = L^ix f  Ludi. This means thatt t o
j^M ax  _  _—i-----  ^ where h(l) =  dHJP  is the probability distribution function (pdf) of /.
/  li th(l)dl 
0
Evaluating the integral we find that
r  M ax    1 Oc — P In 'y    M ax ( a -i
1 ~ I -  a - (3 ~ ( '
The amount of labor allocated to the sector with the highest technology parameter 
is thus a constant function of the parameters. In particular, one should note tha t it 
does not depend on the level of technology A ^ ax} and that it is time invariant. Using 
ht — ip lx  and equation (4.17), the absolute amount of labor allocated to any sector is 
uniquely determined as a function of its relative technology:
r  __ 1—a —(3Lit — ait
1 — a  — (3 + In 7
1 — at — (3
(4.18)
Because Lu  is a continuous transformation of the random variable at*, the cdf of the 
sectoral allocation of labor is given by
H(L) = , 1 - a - P■L/it
1 — a — /? +  ln 7
In -y
(4.19)
The distribution is constant over time and driven by the distribution of the relative 
technology a  and the parameters of the model. While the shape of the distribution is 
constant over time, there is perpetual movement of sectors along the distribution, driven 
by the movement of sectors along the relative technology distribution as a result of R&D 
and random discoveries. This obviously means that there is a continuous movement of 
the labor force across sectors as well.
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Two results on the distribution of labor across sectors need to be underlined at this 
stage. First, the amount of labor allocated to the sector with the highest technology, 
L Maxy is an increasing function of the ’’degree” of decreasing returns to scale of the 
production function. Defining £ =  a +  (3 as the degree of decreasing returns, we see 
that — =  '(i-J)'* ^  0- The farther one moves from constant returns to scale (the 
smaller £), the smaller the amount of labor allocated to the highest technology sector. 
In other words, if there are large decreasing returns to scale, the total mass of labor is 
allocated in a more widespread manner across sectors, and vice versa. In the extreme 
case where a  +  (3 =  1 , the entire mass of labor is allocated to the one sector with the 
highest technology. Because this sector changes permanently, this would imply that 
only one sector (but a different one at each time) is used in equilibrium.
This is obviously not a desirable outcome, which is why we impose that a  + (3 < 1 . 
The assumption can be justified by the need to have all sectors used in equilibrium. 
One could avoid that shortcut by assuming that each sector allows the production of a 
slightly differentiated final good, and that consumers value diversity3. This would not 
add anything to the results, however, and would merely complicate the setting.
Second, beyond determining the amount of labor allocated to the sector with the 
highest technology, the parameters a , (3 and 7  are crucial in determining the shape of the 
distribution function of labor across sectors. In other words, these parameters determine 
whether the labor force is highly concentrated in the top (high technology) sectors, 
or whether it is more widespread across sectors. Graphically, we have the following 
representations (Figures 4.2 to 4.5, 7  =  1.3):
h(L) 1 
0.8 
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2 0.4 0 6
0.4
0.2
0.2 0.4 0.6 0 8 Lit
Fig. 4.2: H  (L) and h(L) (dots), a  +  f3 = 0.3 Fig. 4.3: H  (L) and h{L) (dots), a + (3 = 0.5
3Grossman and Helpman (1991a) provide a formalisation of this argument.
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Fig. 4.4: H  (L ) and h(L) (dots), a  +  (3 =  0.7 Fig. 4.5: H  (L ) and h(L) (dots), a  -f (3 =  0.9
The equilibrium wage is unique across sectors and equal to its marginal product, 
(3AitX?lL%fl . Using equilibrium condition (4.8) for Xu, we obtain that w t =
_ l _  _ 2 o _  -
(3Aft a a  1~a L it 1 “ . Because this holds for any sector, it also holds for the highest 
technology sector. The equilibrium wage is thus given by
1 — a — (3
wt =  A tM a x 1-0
1 — a  — /3 +  ln 7
1—a—ft 1 —a
(4.20)
Dynamics
It is clear from the previous section that the dynamics of the model is driven by the R&D 
process affecting the sectors’ relative technological position. From equation (4.18), we 
find that
Lit
Lu 1 — a — (3A-
R t In 7 (4.21)
The labor force allocated to a given sector falls at a constant rate (as long a s  Rf t
r]A^Iax Tir“
is constant, which is true on the balanced growth path) proportional to the growth rate 
of the cutting-edge technology, as long as there is no discovery in the sector. Starting 
from maximal employment L Max, every sector thus registers a falling labor force as other 
sectors make discoveries and attract labor. Note that the higher the growth rate of the 
cutting-edge technology, the faster employment in a sector falls, absent discovery. An 
innovation generates a discrete jump in employment back to L Max.
Because the equilibrium supply of intermediate good X u  depends ultimately on the
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labor force employed in sector i , it follows the same dynamic pattern as Lu. The 
monopolist thus supplies a quantity X u  that falls constantly from an initial maximal 
level (determined by A^lax and L Max) at the time of discovery. A subsequent discovery 
in the sector implies that the incumbent monopolist is displaced by a new one. Using 
equation (4.8 ),
X u = _________P
X it (1-C*)(1 - c t - 0 )
X- Rt
r,A ■ 1 —cr
In 7 (4.22)
The dynamics of the monopolist’s profit can be calculated easily. Because we assume 
unit marginal cost of production, ttu =  PitXu — X u, where Pu and X u  are given by 
equations (4.9) and (4.8). Using equation (4.18), profit is given by
7Vu — - - 1a
a A  Q A ^ ax ^ Q Q ^ 1 — a — /? +  ln 7
1 — a — (3
-JL-
(4.23)
From this, we can see that the level of profit follows the same dynamic pattern as 
that of X u , absent discovery:
7^  it X u -A ■ In7 . (4.24)
7Tit X u  (1 — a) (1 — a — p) ^A Mc 
The dynamic evolution of the wage rate is derived from equation (4.20) as follows:
Wt
wt
Rt
1 — a VA ^
—  ln 7 (4.25)
It is helpful to visualize the dynamic evolution of Lu and nu for different values of 
the parameters, absent discovery (Figures 4.6 and 4.7).
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Fig. 4.6: Lit(t), £ =  0.5 (dots) and £ =  0.8 Fig. 4.7: 7r ( t ) , £ =  0.5 (dots) and £ =  0.8
Equilibrium  and Labor Reallocation Effect
Solving for the balanced growth path requires us to determine the steady-state level of 
R&D activity. Free entry into R&D means that by arbitrage its marginal cost is equal 
to its expected marginal profit. Equation (4.23) gives the level of profit at time t for 
a monopolist with technological level An. Any existing monopolist, however, faces the 
risk of being displaced by some innovator.
At any time s >  t, the probability that a monopolist ’’born” on date t still holds
- A - (5-0
its monopoly is equal to e 11 AtM a x , as long as  Ri t ■ is constant over time,„ A M a x 1 QT)Aft
which is true on the balanced growth path. According to equation (4.23), the profit at 
time s for a monopolist whose discovery occurred at time t  is given by
"7T ■» —
1
 1a
1 — a — /? +  ln7
1 - a - P (4.26)
The expected value of a discovery at time t, Vf, is equal to the discounted stream 
of profit, taking into account the probability of seeing the monopoly position disappear. 
We have thus that
°r i g
Vt =  e-(r+Xa)(s-t)n A M a x ^ ^  A Max ^  ^  ^
where o  = \ is constant on the balanced growth path, and where Q =
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2
— l] 1 Q. Given that the arrival rate of discovery is the same
across sectors, the expected marginal product of R&D is equal to W t. By arbitrage it 
must then be that
W t = r]AflaxT^  (4.28)
where the right hand side is equal to the marginal cost of R&D.
Arbitrage and steady-state thus require that
oo
A J  e-<r+A‘'><s- ‘>n [as] <i—)<?-.-«■ ds =  r> (4.29)
t
The equilibrium level a  of R&D can be obtained explicitly if one recognizes that
^  =  —Act In 7. Solving this differential equation with initial condition a* =  1 , we have
that as =  e- (Acrln7)(s-t). Using this in the arbitrage condition, we obtain
00
Afi J  e~lr+Xa>e~ “ds = t) (4.30)
0
which means that 1— Vwin-Y—  =  ^ . The steady state level of R&D is thus
r + A a + ' ( i - a ) ( i - a - / J 5
given by
i ro
(4.31)< 7  =
1 +  /?In7___( l - a ) ( l - a - / 3 )
Given this constant level of effective research a on the balanced growth path, the 
economy exhibits the following dynamic properties in steady state:
• The cutting-edge technology grows at the constant rate g =  Act In 7 .
• Output grows at the constant rate —g.
• The labor force allocated to sector i falls at the constant rate as long as
no discovery arises in the sector, while it discretely jumps to L Max at the time of 
discovery.
• The equilibrium level of intermediate input supplied by the incumbent monopolist 
in sector i falls at the constant rate as long as no discovery arises in
the sector. The level of profit in the sector falls at the same rate from its initial 
maximal level at the date of discovery, absent discovery.
• The wage increases at the constant rate 3^ -g .
The behavior of the economy is thus quite similar to what is traditionally derived 
in Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth. A steady-state is obtained where the 
growth rate of variables is ultimately determined by the amount of equilibrium R&D 
and hence technological progress. All parameters that affect the incentives to conduct 
R&D act in the usual way.
What is new in the dynamics of this model is that it implies a continuous reallocation 
of the labor force across sectors and a gradual decline in the extent to which a sector is 
used relative to the others in producing final output, absent discovery. At any point of 
time, some sector innovates and attracts extra labor, which comes from all the sectors 
that fail to innovate. In addition to creative destruction in monopolistic positions, 
there is thus also creative destruction in jobs, as a result of the process of technological 
development. In other words, jobs are currently being lost in, say, the metallurgic 
industry, but are being replaced by new jobs in the higher technology computer or 
pharmaceutical industries.
The setting elaborated above allows us to explicitly derive a quantitative measure of 
the cross-sectoral labor reallocation effect. Equation (4.21) indicates the rate at which 
La falls over time, absent discovery. We have also derived the pdf of the sectoral labor
This allows us to calculateallocation, h (L ) =  dHd^ , with domain L  £ 0, 1 ■
j^ Max
the total fall in the labor force employed in the ’’decreasing sectors” as f  Lah (La) dL.
0
Denoting the fail in labor force per unit of time as 6, we have that
- 6  =  - , 9In 7
Hence,
1 — a  — (3
l m ax
1 — a — /? +  In 7
in 7 r j-T
J  V -  dL (4.32)
0
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6 =
1 - a - P '
(4.33)
Given the constant unit mass labor force L, 8 represents the rate at which the labor 
force is reallocated across sectors4. Using g = 0.01 and a  +  (3 =  0.7 implies that 
8 =  0.033, which means that 3.3 percent of the labor force is reallocated per unit of 
time. The labor reallocation effect is increasing (linearly) in g, ceteris paribus, and is 
increasing (non-linearly) in (a  -f (3). A rapidly growing economy thus ’’needs” a larger 
amount of labor reallocation per unit of time. If one moves closer to constant returns to 
scale (a + (3 close to 1), i.e. when there is less widespread use of the sectors in producing 
the final output and the labor force is more concentrated in the higher technology sectors, 
the reallocation needs to be larger (Figure 4.8). At the extreme, when a  +  ft — 1, only 
one sector produces at a time, and the entire labor force is constantly being reallocated 
to the highest technology sector.
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Figure 4.8: 8 =  as a function of (a + (5)
This equilibrium labor reallocation process across sectors naturally leads us to wonder 
what may happen if perfect and instantaneous mobility of labor is not possible. In other 
words, what are the effects of labor market rigidities on sectoral labor allocation, R&D, 
growth and wage? What happens if reallocating a metallurgic worker to the computer 
industry is not as smoothly feasible as assumed in the previous sections?
4 It is easy to verify that the increase in the labour force in the sectors experiencing discovery does 
indeed match the decrease in those not experiencing discovery. One only needs to note that the increase
^Max
is given by J  A a  [L Max — Lit\  h (L ) dL,  since A a  is the probability of discovery in any sector. Solving 
o
the integral yields 6 =
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4.2.4 R igidity  in Labor Force Reallocation Across Sectors 
Rationale for Rigidity
-One can think of three main reasons why the actual sectoral labor reallocation may fall 
short of that necessary to equalize the marginal productivity of workers across sectors:
• following the labor market literature, the process of matching workers with va­
cancies is time consuming and can only be done through some type of ’’matching 
function”;
• there are likely to be structural and legal impediments that prevent firings and 
downsizings, which slow down the reallocation process;
• one should recognize that each intermediate sector may require some specific skills 
from its labor force. Having workers changing employment across sectors may thus 
be hampered by such sector specific skills, and is likely to take time for retraining.
Each of these arguments could lead to an alternative way to model rigidity. We 
do not enter in a detailed modeling of the micro-foundations in order to focus on the 
effects of introducing rigidity on the behavior of the economy. We assume that, for a 
combination of the reasons given above, the economy is unable to reallocate the amount 
of labor 8 per unit of time. Instead, rigidities allow only for a fraction </> (0 < (f> < 1) 
of the optimal reallocation 8 to take place. The effective, rigidity constrained, labor 
reallocation is thus given as
^  =  (4-34)
where a lower case r  indicates a variable within the rigidity setting, as opposed to 
the flexible setting.
Sectoral Allocation of Labor and Dynamics with Rigidities
We consider the effect of imposing rigidity (f> on an economy that was previously on its 
full flexibility balanced growth path. We do not formally analyze the transition path 
and focus instead on the new rigidity constrained steady-state. The transition process,
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however, is quite intuitive and can be visualized from the plots of h(L). In order to 
keep the distribution of h (L ) constant over time over the range [0 , LMax], exactly the 
amount 6 of labor needs to be reallocated from the whole range of sectors towards the 
sector experiencing the discovery.
If we introduce rigidities and allow only for (f>8 of labor to be reallocated across 
sectors, the movement between sectors is insufficient to preserve L Max constant. In 
other words, there is not enough mass being redistributed across sectors to fill the ’’gap” 
that is opening on the right side of the distribution h (L ). This sets a transition process 
where L Max starts to fall and the distribution function h (L) changes. Obviously, other 
variables, including particularly the amount of R&D, are also affected.
The transitional change in LMax and h (L) will stop only once the decrease in labor 
force across sectors exactly matches the ’’required” increase, as in the previous section. 
Hence, stability requires that,
^ M a x  j ^ M a x
-  J  U.uhr (Lr) dLr = J [Z,f -  Lr,a] A<rThr (£ ,) dLr =  ^  _  9' _  (4.35)
0 0
where crr , gr are constant on the balanced growth path.
Optimality, as seen above, would require to decrease the labor force in every sector 
at the constant rate If this amount of reallocation is impossible, the
second best is to reallocate as much as feasible. This implies that j f fr  — ~4>\-a ~ p - 
Hence, the rigidity constrained amount of sectoral labor reallocation is given by
a x
-  f  Lnithr (Lr)dLr = <l>— 5 (4.36)
J 1 - a t - p
o
Determining and hr (Lr) requires ’’educated guesswork” and recognizing that
they need to satisfy the following conditions:
.  HT (L " “ ) =  1 ;
92
j^Mdx js constant;
jjMax
-  f  Lrjthr (Lr) dLr =  f  [L™ax -  Lrjt] \ a rhr (Lr) dLr = $ 1 -0 -0 ; 
0 0
if <f> =  1, then we have L ^ ax =  LMax and Hr (L r ) =  H  (L).
Let us then assume the following forms for L^ axand Hr (Lr ):
j jM a x
H r ( L r) =
1 — a — (3 4> In 7
1 — a — (3
I — a — (3
JrAt
1 — a  — j3 +  01n7
(4.37)
(4.38)
It is easy to check that the conditions listed above hold for these equations, where
The labor force allocated to sector i at time t falls, in the absence of discovery, 
at the constant rate =  —<f> from a maximal amount L ^ 0^  at the instant
of discovery as determined by equation (4.37). We can thus determine that L Tju —
 ^ where s is the time when the last discovery occurred in
} M a x
sector i. As in the previous section, however, we continue to assume that =
D
A—  '* i In 7 , which is constant and equal to gr in steady-state. It is clear then that
v A M a x
^ p ix = e~(t~s 9^r. The labor allocation across sectors is thus uniquely determined as
L r , i t  —  1 —a —/3
1 — a — /? +  </> In 7
(4.39)
1 — a — f3
which compares with equation (4.18) in the flexible case. Again, the distribution of 
relative technology parameters an means that the distribution function of the sectoral 
labor allocation is given by equation (4.38).
The core problem of the monopolist is unaffected by the introduction of rigidities in 
labor force reallocation. Profit maximization still implies that Pr>n = £ and X r>n =
i P
The equilibrium quantity of intermediate input i at time t is thus
given by,
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X r , i t  =  [a2A't] 1
1
— Q A t
o3
(1 -a)(]-a-0) 1 — a  — (3 +  <^ >ln7
j^M ax 1 — a — P (4.40)
Profit at time t  is obtained as before as 7Tr>,t =  ( i  — l) X r^t- It follows that
^r,it — l - ia
1—o,—/3(1 —d>) ------ -----
4^ ^1- a )(1- Q- /?) J [ M a .X  (1 —a ) ( l—a  —-p) [ 1  — a — (3 +
1 — a — (3 (4.41)
The effect of introducing rigidity (j> on the labor allocation across sectors is thus quite 
clear. The insufficient amount of labor being freed up from ’’decreasing” sectors implies 
that innovating sectors do not receive as much extra labor as they would under full 
flexibility. This is captured by < L Max. While a sector innovating at time t  has
a shortfall of labor at time t and carries it to 14 - e, the labor ’’freed” at time 14- e will 
not fill that shortfall, as by then some other sector will have innovated. Within a longer 
time horizon, however, rigidities imply that the labor force employed in a sector cannot 
fall as quickly as necessary, which implies that in the longer run, the sector may end up 
with excess labor. The main implication of introducing rigidities is thus tha t sectors 
tha t have recently innovated suffer a shortfall of labor, while sectors that have not seen a 
discovery for some time suffer excess employment. Labor is misallocated across sectors, 
in the sense that marginal productivities cannot be equalized.
The dynamic pattern of labor, equilibrium supply of X r,it and profit, absent discovery, 
are essentially the same as before and determined by:
7 ^  =  <4'42)l^r,it 1 Ck fj
X r,it _  fir,it _  ,________ P_______  /. jn\
Xr,it ~  _  4’( \ - a ) ( l - a - 0 ) 9r ( ' ]
E quilib rium  G row th  and Inequality
The steady-state level of R&D and balanced growth path are obtained as before from 
arbitrage in the R&D sector. The profit flow of an incumbent monopolist is given
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by equation (4.41), and the probability of still holding the monopoly position is equal
- A -
to e nAM a x  1 —a
(s - t ) D
, as long as  ii-y— is constant over time, which is true on the
vAM ax^
balanced growth path. The expected value of a discovery is thus given by
oo
Vrtt = j  e-^r+x<Tr^ s- ^ n rA ^ ax (l-o )( l-O -0 ) AM aX (l-Or)(l-Q- ds (4.44)
where aT =  — Rr,i 1 is constant and Qr = — l] a 1- 1
vAMaxT=Z
Arbitrage and steady-state then require that
1 — q —(3+(f> I117 
l—a—0
o o
A f  e - (r+A,r') (s- ,)n r ds = rj (4.45)
This equation can be solved similarly to equation (4.29) to obtain the steady-state 
level of research ar in the economy with labor force reallocation rigidities:
<Jr = Or
V1 I 0/3 In 71 +  (l—a)(l—a—p)
The cutting-edge technology thus grows at the constant rate gr 
output grows at the rate
(4.46) 
Acrr ln 7 , while
A detailed comparative analysis of the flexible and rigidity constrained economies is 
left for the following section. At this stage, we need to analyze the impact of the sectoral 
labor misallocation. As noted, rigidities prevent the optimal, marginal productivity 
equalizing, amount of labor to be allocated to each sector. If labor is paid its marginal 
product, then, rigidities generate wage inequality.
Since wrAt =  — PAitX^itL^J^ , we obtain from equation (4.39) that the wage
rate in sector i at time t is given by
w r , i t  =  /3< x l - Q A t  ° A t
1- q  a Max 1~Q 1 — a — (3 .
1 — 0 —0 
1-Q
(4.47)
1 — a — /? +  </> In 7
The wage rate is thus not equal across sectors, as it was in the economy with full 
flexibility. In fact, at any given time t , wage is an increasing function of the sectoral
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technology level An. One can also observe that =  j ^ 9 r ,  which implies that 
wages increase at a constant rate across all sectors that do not experience discovery, 
even though their levels differ.
Wage being equal across sectors in the flexible economy, the average wage wt is equal 
to the prevailing wage wt as given by equation (4.20). In the economy with rigidity, 
on the other hand, the average wage wr t is determined as the labor-weighted average
j^ Max
of the respective wages in all sectors, f  w^uhj. (Lr) dLr. Using equation (4.39), one
o
can express wr>n as a function of A ^ ax and Lr^t and solve the integral, which gives the 
average rigidity constrained wage as
wrjt= a  — (3
1 — a — (3 + 0 1 n 7
l - a - 0
1~ a  1  —  a  .
(1 -  a) +  (1 -  4>) In 7
which is to be compared with equation (4.20) in the flexible economy. Because (f> < 1 
and < I, we can conclude that wr t<wt: the average wage in the rigid
economy is lower than in the flexible economy. Also, -g r, which means that
K>r,t
the growth rate of the average wage in the rigid economy is lower than in the flexible one 
inasmuch as gr < g, which remains to be determined. Note also that the average wage 
wrj  increases faster than the wage wrjit in sectors not experiencing discovery. Rigidities 
and inequality indeed generate a catch-up phenomenon whereby the innovating sectors 
see the wage jump discretely to the top-end of the wage distribution. This phenomenon 
was absent in the flexible setting, where wage is equal across all sectors.
The wage being different across sectors and changing continuously over time, it is 
useful to define a relative wage measure whose distribution remains constant over time. 
Let wrjit =  —Wr'ilt be the prevailing wage rate adjusted by a proportional function of
j ^ M a x  1 — a
the cutting-edge level of technology. We have that
^ r,it
2a
p a 1- 0 1 — a  — (3
1 — a — (3 + (f> In 7
1 -d>
M  i- “ (4.49)
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Given that an has a constant distribution function H  (a) =  a 'n~<, u>a is distributed 
according to the following time-independent cdf:
Hr iy^ r) — i—a—B Ur,it
l  l —or 
In 7 1—^
(4.50)
where u r,n €
l  — a — 0
o r —  l i_o
The constant distribution of relative wages u>n does not prevent movement of sectors 
along that distribution. To the contrary, and as before, sectors are constantly moving 
along the relative wage distribution, but with sectoral movements constantly cancelling 
each other to keep the distribution constant. The same way backward sectors catch 
up with high technology sectors through innovations, low relative wage sectors catch up 
with high relative wage sectors through innovation. There are thus constant changes as 
to which sectors are high wage or low wage.
4.3  Labor M arkets, R & D , G row th  and  In eq u a lity
As the model elaborated above shows, a relatively simple extension of the Schumpeterian 
process of creative destruction to jobs generates informative results on a range of issues, 
which have been analyzed in distinct strands of the literature. We now turn to the main 
results of the model and relate them to some of the existing literature.
4.3.1 Sectoral Labor A llocation, R igidity and  G row th
Kuznets (1955) first expressed the idea that the reallocation of labor from one sector 
of the economy to the other may be closely linked to growth and inequality, if a labor 
productivity gap exists between the two sectors. Denison (1967), and others more 
recently, argued that the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry accounts for 
a significant part of the rapid growth experienced by Western countries in the 1950s-60s, 
and that it could explain the more recent productivity slowdown as reallocation came 
to an end. Others, including Squire (1981) and Poirson (2000), have used the same
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idea to explain the dualism that characterizes labor markets in developing countries or 
to explain growth.
These papers all suffer from a lack of theoretical foundation, however. In particular, 
they fail to identify the source of the labor productivity gap between the two sectors and 
to take into account the effects of labor reallocation on the productivity differential. All 
also focus on the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry, which means that 
their contribution is limited to analyzing growth over a historically short transitionary 
period.
The model we have developed, on the other hand, shows how labor reallocation across 
sectors is an equilibrium phenomenon. The very nature of growth through technolog­
ical change requires permanent labor reallocation. We also show that the relationship 
between growth and labor reallocation is more complex than depicted by the literature 
mentioned above, which quickly concludes that fast reallocation generates high growth. 
As Poirson asserts, ”these countries that reallocate their workers more efficiently over 
time tend to grow faster, in per worker terms, ceteris paribus. ” 5 While this may be true 
for countries in transition from agriculture-based economies to industrial economies, this 
may not be the case in general, our model shows.
In order to analyze the impact of labor reallocation rigidities </> on growth in our 
model, we need to compare the equilibrium level of R&D in the flexible and rigid cases, 
a  and oy as given by equations (4.31) and (4.46), respectively. It is easy to verify that 
> flr for 0 < (j) < 1 . The term in brackets on the RHS of equation (4.31) is thus 
larger than that in the RHS of equation (4.46), which implies that there exists an effect 
through which increasing flexibility induces a higher level of R&D. Explicitly, we can 
calculate that ^ = [ 1 - 1] ^  [M - f T 1] > 0 -
There exists a second effect, however, through which decreasing flexibility induces a 
higher level of R&D. This is evident from the denominator in the first term on the RHS 
of equation (4.46). These two counteracting effects mean that we cannot unequivocally 
sign Whether increasing the degree of flexibility of the labor market generates a
5Poirson (2000), p. 22.
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rise or a fall in the steady-state level of R&D and growth is thus undetermined. In 
fact, taking the derivative, we can determine that the condition for higher flexibility to 
generate higher R&D is that
—  — ^ ^ -----> f t -  (4.51)
* \ — a  — (3 + (j)\nr) X K J
What is needed is that the first effect dominates the second. Intuitively, the first 
effect, which increases R&D when labor market flexibility rises, occurs from the fact that 
more flexibility allows the economy to ’’use” the sector with the highest technology to 
a larger extent. In other words, flexibility allows the economy to reach a level 
closer to the optimal level L Max. A higher L ^ ax obviously implies a higher demand for 
the monopolist’s intermediate input in the period immediately following discovery. The 
first effect is thus that more flexibility generates a higher demand for a monopolist in 
the early stage of the ’’life” of the monopoly, and hence a higher profit.
The second effect is the inverse corollary of the first. We have indeed seen tha t a 
lower degree of flexibility slows down the pace at which the labor force can be reallocated 
from non-innovating to innovating sectors. This means that the labor force, and hence 
the demand facing the monopolist and its profit, do not fall as rapidly as otherwise.
In brief, rigidity hurts the monopolist in the early stages following discovery of the 
new vintage as it reduces maximal demand, but it benefits it in the sense that, even 
though starting from a lower base, the demand falls at a slower pace. Which of the two 
effects dominates the other depends on the value of the parameters and the degree of 
rigidity around which the marginal effect of increased flexibility is measured. The impact 
of rigidity on the equilibrium level of growth can be understood more easily graphically. 
Using a = 0.3 and /3 =  0.4, we have (Figures 4.9 to 4.12)
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Fig. 4.9: o  (dots) and aT (0), with 7  =  1.5 Fig. 4.10: a  (dots) and a r (0) with 7  =  1 .8
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Fig. 4.11: cr (dots) and crr (0) with 7  =  2  Fig. 4.12: a  (dots) and a r (0) with 7  =  3
We can see that with 7  =  1.5, the maximal level of growth is reached when 0  =  1, i.e. 
when there is full flexibility in labor reallocation. We also see, interestingly, th a t when 
7  =  1.8 or larger, the maximal level of growth is reached within 0  € ]0,1[. Reaching the 
maximal growth rate thus requires a certain level of rigidity in labor force reallocation 
across sectors. We can see that the growth-maximizing degree of rigidity increases with 
7 , the ’’size of innovation” parameter.
The relation between labor reallocation flexibility and growth is thus more complex 
than could appear at first analysis, and reaching definite conclusions would require cal­
ibrating the model to actual data. The interesting conclusion that can be drawn from 
the theory is that rigidity, i.e. sub-optimal allocation of labor across sectors, does not 
necessarily imply lower steady-state growth.
4.3 .2  E q u ilib riu m  W age In e q u a lity
While the effect of sectoral labor reallocation rigidities on the equilibrium level of R&D 
and growth is not unequivocal, the model shows a clear effect of rigidities on wage in­
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equality. We derived that the economy with rigidities in sectoral labor force reallocation 
generates a continuum of relative wages u r^t with time-independent distribution func­
tion Hr (cjr)- This constant distribution of relative wage allows us to derive explicitly 
the two most traditional measures of inequality as a function of the parameters of the 
model: the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient. The average relative wage, which is also 
equal to the total wage because we assume a unit mass of labor, cjr, is given by
l  — a —/3
_2o_ f  1 — a  — (3 \ i - q  1 — aa;r=  (3aT=s  ---------------------- ----- -—  ------ (4.52)
\1  — a  — P -\- (pln'y J 1 — (p + I — a
Using equation (4.49), we can calculate the shares of total wage income of any share 
of the total population. The equation for the Lorenz curve is given by,
f (x)  = x ^ hl'y+1 (4.53)
where x  E [0,1] is the share of the total population. One can see that if <f> =  1 ,
f  (x) = x, indicating the absence of inequality. This result should be obvious since we
saw in the first part of the model that fully flexible labor force reallocatipn implies an 
equalization of wage across sectors.
The Gini coefficient is obtained straightforwardly as
G = 1 - (1 - ^ 17 ; a2)( l - a )  <4-54)
where G — 0 if (p — 1, indicating again that full flexibility implies zero inequality.
It is informative to plot the Lorenz curves implied by the model for different values 
of the parameters (Figures 4.13 to 4.16).
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Figure 4.13: a  =  0.3, (f> =  0.7, 7  =  1.5 Figure 4.14: a  =  0.3, 0 =  0.7, 7  =  2
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Figure 4.15: a  =  0.3, (j> =  0.7, 7  =  3 Figure 4.16: a  =  0.3, (f> =  0.7, 7  =  4
We can see from these that a relatively large value of the parameter 7  is necessary to 
generate a large degree of inequality. Similarly, we can see that an increasing degree of 
labor market rigidity raises the level of equilibrium inequality, ceteris paribus (Figures 
4.17 to 4.20).
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Figure 4.17: a  =  0.3, (f) =  0.9, 7  =  2  Figure 4.18: a  =  0.3, (f> =  0.7, 7  =  2
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Figure 4.19: a  =  0.3, = 0.5, 7  =  2 Figure 4.20: a  =  0.3, (f) =  0.3, 7  =  2
The following table provides values of the Gini coefficients for different sets of pa­
rameters. It provides a clear measure of how the different parameters affect the degree 
of equilibrium inequality.
Gini coefficients fo r  different sets ofparameters
a=0.3 a=0.3 a=0.3 a=0.3 a=0.3 a=0.3 a=0.5 a=0.',
7=1. 1 7=1-3 7=1.5 7=2.0 7=3.0 7=2.0 7=2.0 7=2. C
<f>=0.1 0.06 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.38 0.51
0=0.2 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.48
0=0.3 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.45
0=0.4 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.41
0=0.5 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.37
0=0.6 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.32
<fi=0.7 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.26
0=0.8 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.19
0=0.9 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.10
0=1.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4.1
The model thus clearly shows that rigidities in sectoral labor reallocation generate 
a certain degree of equilibrium inequality. The degree of equilibrium inequality itself 
is influenced by three parameters of the model: the degree of rigidity, (p, the size of 
innovation, 7 , and the degree of monopoly power, a. Clearly, rigidities in sectoral labor 
reallocation increase the degree of equilibrium inequality. Also, large innovations gener­
ate higher inequality, ceteris paribus, while higher monopoly power (lower a)  decreases 
it.
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It is also interesting to reassert a point that was made earlier: for a given level of 
maximum technology Af'Iax, average wage is lower in the rigid economy than in the flex­
ible economy, ceteris paribus. Rigidities thus introduce a static efficiency loss. We have 
seen earlier, however, that the impact of rigidities on steady-state growth is uncertain. 
It may very well be, in fact, that the rigid economy grows faster than the flexible econ­
omy, i.e. tha t gr > g. The average wage may thus increase faster in equilibrium in the 
rigid economy than in the flexible one, meaning that rigidities may generate a dynamic 
efficiency gain in terms of wage and growth. There could thus be a trade-off in terms 
of welfare between wage dispersion and lower average wage as a result of rigidities, and 
higher future wage growth. In other words, agents may be ready to suffer the possi­
bility of being among the lower wage earners today if that allows them to benefit from 
potentially higher wages in the future. Such a welfare analysis is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, and would require strong assumptions about the mobility of workers along 
the relative wage curve.
4.3.3 Inequality  and G row th
The links between growth and rigidities and between rigidities and inequality established 
above allow us to shed some new light on the debate on inequality and growth initiated 
by Kuznets (1955) and subsequently developed in many directions in attempts to explain 
the nexus growth-inequality or inequality-growth. The growth-inequality causality has 
been the subject of a vast empirical literature. Dollar and Kraay (2000) provide a recent 
study and review of that literature. The causality from inequality to growth has been 
the subject of a great deal of recent theoretical studies, highlighting channels through 
which inequality may harm growth.
The model elaborated above derives a more nuanced and indirect relationship be­
tween growth and inequality. We showed that rigidities in sectoral labor reallocation 
unequivocally increase equilibrium inequality, but that such rigidities may have a posi­
tive or negative impact on growth. It is thus impossible to derive a clear-cut relationship 
between growth and inequality, just as it was impossible to reach definite conclusions on 
the growth-rigidity nexus.
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As is clear from the figures relating equilibrium R&D ar and rigidity 0, whether 
reducing inequality (in this case through increasing flexibility) generates a fall or a rise 
in the equilibrium growth rate depends on the parameters of the model and the initial 
level of rigidity. The extent to which increasing flexibility reduces inequality as measured 
by the Gini coefficient is also affected by the parameters a  and 7  describing the economy.
The growth-inequality nexus thus appears particularly complex, even in the relatively 
simple setting of the model. In particular, countries characterized by different sets 
of parameters are likely to exhibit distinct relationships, complicating the derivation 
of clear results through cross-sectional empirical studies. Allowing for redistributive 
policies, which we completely abstracted from in the theoretical setting, would make the 
relationship yet more complex.
4 .4  C onclusion
Extending the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction to jobs allowed us to de­
rive several new and important results on sectoral labor allocation, R&D, growth and 
inequality. The basic flexible model highlights the extent to which technological progress 
implies a constant reallocation of labor across sectors.
We then showed how rigidities in the labor reallocation process generate a given level 
of equilibrium inequality, which is an increasing function of the level of rigidity and other 
parameters of the model, in particular the size of technological innovations. Although 
equilibrium inequality is constant in steady-state, there is mobility of individuals along 
the wage curve.
One important policy implication is that there may be avenues to reduce inequality 
without need to put in place distortionary policies. In particular, inequality could be 
reduced through:
• a reduction in the legal measures preventing mobility, including firing costs or 
bankruptcy procedures;
• general purpose education, which is likely to favor a quicker and smoother adap­
tation of workers to sector-specific skills;
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•  on-the-job training programs, which allow workers to gain the necessary sector- 
specific skills.
While such policies may contribute to reduce inequality, it obviously does not mean 
that they can replace redistributive policies, but rather that there is likely to be some 
scope to reduce inequality through non-distortionary policies.
Also, the model shows that increasing flexibility in labor force reallocation may have 
positive or negative effects on steady-state growth, including wage growth. A particu­
larly complex relationship between growth, labor market rigidities and inequality thus 
emerges.
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4 .5  A p p en d ix  to  C hap ter 4
4.5.1 A ppendix  4A
We show here that the constant returns to scale function
Yijt = AilX?jtLpijt
1—a—/?
(3 Ct
f i n ).
(4.55)
can indeed be rewritten as
Yit =  AuX?tL i  (4.56)
and with a unique, constant and strictly defined output maximizing number of firms 
operating in all sectors. Equation (4.55) implies that the public good is an essential 
good in the production of final output. We assume, along the lines of Barro and Sala- 
i-Martin (1992), that the public good is subject to congestion. Instead of assuming 
tha t congestion is an increasing function of total output, we assume that congestion 
is a function of the total number of firms operating in the economy. The amount of 
’’effective” public good is thus a decreasing function of the number of firms. In effect, an 
excessive number of firms using roads, asking for services from the public administration, 
etc. makes the effective amount available to each firm smaller. We make the very general 
assumption for the moment that the effective amount of public good is equal to .
It should be obvious from equation (4.55) that on the one hand, decreasing returns 
to scale in X  and L  in any sector acts as an incentive to decrease the size of the firms. 
There is a countervailing force, however, that necessarily limits the number of firms, as 
the amount of effective public good decreases with n. We proceed to show that, under 
certain conditions on /  (n), the output maximizing number of firms is equal in any sector 
and constant across time and independent of the level of public good G.
Suppose for a moment there is only one sector with production function Y» = 
3  I" rAtXj^Ljt , where j  is a firm index. If there are n  firms of equal size, total
output is given by
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\xt]
a Li 0 [ G l
Iai
n n J (n).Yt =  nYu =  nAt 
where Xt  =  nXjt  and Lt =  nLjt. This can be rewritten as
l - a - /3
(4.57)
Yt
./(«)
Several cases are thus possible:
AtG\~a~eX?Lt (4.58)
jjfo is everywhere decreasing in n. In such a case, the optimal number of firm is 
equal to 1 .
is everywhere increasing in n. In such a case, the optimal firm size in in- 
finitesimally small, and n —* oo.
is first increasing in n then decreasing in n. In such a case, there exists a 
unique positive (greater than 1) output maximizing number of firms n*. This 
number is constant across time and independent of G.
f  (n) =  n. In such a case, the output maximizing number of firms in indeterminate.
Empirically, the third and fourth cases are the most relevant. We chose to focus on 
the third case, which implies a unique, constant and finite number of output maximizing 
firms. For example, could take the following form: =  —  n with A >  1
I  A A J
and 'ifj >  1 . Graphically, we would have
5 10 15 20n 25 30 35 40
Figure 4.21: with A =  10, tp =  1.5
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With such a functional form, we assume that there is no congestion when only one 
firm operates, and that the congestion effect is low for a relatively small number of firms, 
but that it becomes significant once a certain threshold is attained. Given tha t n* is a 
constant and independent of G , we can write the production function for the sector as a 
jfn*) AtGt a Xj*Lt. If we consider Gt as given in period t, wewhole as Yt 
can rewrite this as
Yt =  A tX fL 1? (4.59)
The same argument can be applied if we have a continuum of sectors i in [0,1]. In 
such a case, the production function becomes,
Yij t = A*X?jtL?jt Gt
f
l
f  nidi 
LO
l —a —j3
(4.60)
where n* is the number of firms in sector i. By symmetry of sectors, we have 
that n* = n*- = n*. All sectors thus have the same number of output maximizing 
firms. Following the same argument as for the one-sector case, we can thus rewrite the 
production function for sector i at time t as
Yit = A n X S L l (4.61)
where An =
f  n*di
1  —  Q — P
G j - ^ A u .  If, for simplicity, we take Gt as constant
over time , we have that An is just a scaled version of An-
4.5.2 A ppendix  4B
Define the relative technology parameter an as
an —
A**‘
(4.62)
By construction, relative technology parameters are distributed over [0,1].
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Technological progress is defined in such a way that a sector experiencing discovery 
jumps from An to Let F  (A, t )  be the cumulative distribution function of absolute
technology parameters at time t . By definition, F(AoIaxy0) = 1.
The density to the left of A ff01 falls at a rate equal to ^  =  — F  (A qI(IX, t) \I/t,
where =  A ~t—r- is the Poisson arrival rate. On the steady-state, is a constant
r jA ^ a x  1- °
(implying that the absolute amount of resources devoted to R&D, Rt increases together 
with At*01). We have thus the following differential equation with its associated initial 
condition:
d F (A { fax,t)
dt
F(A%*ax, 0) =  1
(4.63)
(4.64)
Also, we have seen that -Ajtx =  A ■ * r ~ In 7 , which means that in steady-state
*
d A f c
dt =  AtMax# ln 7 (4.65)
The differential equation (4.63) has the following unique solution:
F(Afi fax, t ) = e  0
- f V d s
(4.66)
Equation (4.65), on the other hand, implies that
Af fax = Agfaxe
In' y f  &ds
(4.67)
From this, we have that
a x
y jJW oi
- f * d s
" 7 =  e 0 . Using equation (4.66), we find that
F  ( Aq , ^  =
j^ M a x In 7
(4.68)
which is obviously valid for any s < t,  i.e. F (A ? °* ,t)  =
1 1 0
I M a x
K
In 7
Since Af'Jax is a 
and obtain that F  
relative technology
constant at time t , we can scale the random variable A by A^Iax
( Aft lax \  ’ yjMox I jn ^A%fax ? M =  • The cumulative distribution function of
parameters is thus given by
H  (a) = a'n~f
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Chapter 5
W inner-Take-All M arkets, 
Hum an Capital, Inequality and  
Growth
5.1 In trod u ction
Striking back in 1999, George Lucas added an estimated $400 million in earnings to his 
(financial) empire. In another stars’ war, Oprah Winfrey, the Queen Amidala of reality 
shows, earned a staggering $150 million both in 1999 and 2000. At the same time, 
23 people in the U.S.A. had fortunes in excess of $10 billion, and 13 young Americans 
(under 40) had accumulated fortunes in excess of $1 billion, all of them as ”wiz-kids” in 
new-economy sectors1.
Meanwhile, President Clinton had to fight hard to raise the Federal minimum wage 
in 1996 and 1997 to $4.75 and $5.15 per hour. Such increases, however, only marginally 
compensated the erosion of the real minimum wage initiated in the 1970s. In real terms, 
the minimum wage reached $10,900 per annum (1998 dollars) on the basis of a 40-hour 
week, lower than in 1956 and 30 percent lower than in 1968 (Figure 5.1).
E stim ates are from Forbes "Celebrity 100” and ”400 U.S. Richest” and Fortune "America’s Forty 
Richest under 40.”
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Figure 5.1: Real US minimum wage
On a less anecdotal note, the US Census Bureau reports that the top quintile of 
households appropriated 49.2 percent of aggregate income in 1998, up from just under 
44 percent in 1980. More strikingly still, the top 5 percent of households earned 21.4 
percent of aggregate income in 1998, up from 15.8 percent in 1980, while the bottom 
quintile earned a miserable 3.6 percent in 1998, down from 4.3 percent in 1980.
The same data reveal that the top 40 percent of households earned just under 6  times 
as much, on average, than the bottom 40 percent of households in 1998, compared with 
just under 5 times as much in the early 1970s2. There has thus been relatively little 
change in relative earnings positions among these two broadly defined categories of the 
population (Figure 5.2).
A more marked trend has occurred when the top 20 percent of households are com­
pared with the bottom 20 percent. In such a case, the top households earned on average 
just under 10 times as much than the bottom 20 percent in the early 1970s, rising to 
just under 14 times as much in 1998.
The most important trend, however, occurred in the income concentration among 
the top 5 percent of households. While those earned on average just under 15 times
2The US Census Bureau reports a break in the series in 1993. Data are thus not fully comparable. 
In 1992 (pre-break), however, the highest 40 percent of households earned 5.4 times as much on average 
than the lowest 40 percent.
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as much as the bottom 20 percent in the early 1970s, they earned 24 times as much in 
1998.
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Figure 5.2: Relative average earnings
The rise in concentration of income toward the top is even more radical if one con­
siders the very top (1 percent or less) income earners. Feenberg and Poterba (2000) 
calculate that the top 0.5 percent of households accounted for just over 6 percent of ag­
gregate adjusted gross income in 1970, almost doubling to 11.3 percent in 1995 (Figure 
5.3).
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Figure 5.3: Top 0.5 percent of households as percentage of national AGI
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While much research has been devoted to understanding the roots of the rising income 
inequality in the U.S. (and elsewhere) over the past decades, most of the literature has 
focused on explaining the rising skilled/unskilled wage premium, principally by invoking 
skill-biased technological change3. We argue here that this strand of the literature is 
unable to explain the rising concentration of income and wealth among a minute percent­
age of the population, however. Instead, we maintain that the increasing prevalence of 
winner-take-all (WTA) markets could be one of the main causes of such rising inequality.
We begin this chapter by characterizing WTA markets. We then proceed to model 
the agents’ investment decision in human capital in such WTA markets, in parallel with 
the incentives to invest in education. This allows us to shed new light on the incentives 
and growth effects of redistributive taxation, whereby extreme income earners are subject 
to a tax on part of their income.
5.2  T h e  W in n er-T a k e(s)-(It)-A ll P h en o m en o n
Abba (1980) powerfully highlighted, if quite informally at least melodiously and success­
fully, the existence of WTA phenomena. They were participating themselves, in fact, in 
one of the most glamourous and obvious WTA markets: popular music. In a more aca­
demic, but still rather informal fashion, Frank and Cook (1995) analyze the mechanisms 
underlying the emergence of WTA markets in American society, and their consequences 
for economic efficiency, inequality and social ethics. The subtitle of their book, ” How 
more and more Americans compete for ever fewer and bigger prizes, encouraging eco­
nomic waste, income inequality, and an impoverished cultural life", is quite revealing of 
their analysis.
Frank and Cook, in essence, estimate that WTA markets generate wasteful invest­
ments as a result of perverse private incentives to agents responding to competition in 
peculiarly structured markets. Their book, however, consists essentially of an enumer­
ation of examples of WTA markets, and fails to provide any formal modelling.
3 See, among others, the studies by Murphy and Welch (1992), Gottschalk (1993, 1997), Autor, Katz 
and Krueger (1998), Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Acemoglu (1998) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
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Efforts to formalize some WTA markets have been carried out elsewhere. Most 
notable are papers by Rosen (1981) and Rosen and Sanderson (2000), which consider, 
theoretically and empirically, respectively, the ” economics of superstar” and labor mar­
kets in professional sports. Although valuable, these papers are quite specific and do 
not consider WTA markets globally.
A different strand of the literature has attempted to explain why risk-averse agents 
choose to participate in lotteries and gambling (fair or unfair). Simultaneous partic­
ipation in lotteries and insurance purchasing indeed constitutes a puzzle for expected 
utility maximization theory. Friedman and Savage (1948) first attempted to explain 
such behavior by proposing a class of utility function compatible with risk aversion and 
local preference for risk. Conlisk (1993) works along the lines of Friedman and Savage 
to explain why globally risk-averse agents engage into gambling activities involving small 
stakes.
The following section underlines the essence of WTA markets and shows how and 
why they have become more prevalent in the recent past. Typical examples of WTA 
phenomena are highlighted.
5.2.1 C haracteristics and  Typical W TA  M arkets
As is clear from their name, WTA markets are characterized by the fact that of all the 
participants in the ’’market” or ’’game”, only the winner gains a prize. The other key 
feature of WTA markets is the marginal difference in effort, quality, skill, or other key 
characteristics that exists between the winner(s) and the losers. The difference between 
winning and loosing, although potentially extreme in terms of payoff, may thus be partly 
attributable to luck or other external factors outside the participants’ control.
Athletes in general compete in what can be considered as the ultimate WTA markets. 
A tiny minority of aspiring professional athletes ever make it to the top, by definition 
of competitive sport, and the distribution of payoffs, however- large they may be overall, 
is extremely skewed towards the winners4. Also, whether one ends up as a top-earning
4 Michael Jordan earned around $80 million annually in the last years of his career as an active NBA
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professional depends, aside from talent, dedication and effort, significantly on luck: the 
luck of avoiding injury, finding the proper trainer and infrastructure, starting the sport 
appropriate to one’s potential talent, etc.
The difference between winners and losers is often minute as well, aiid sometimes 
even quite subjective. While Mary Lou Retton became an American icon after her 
Olympic titles in gymnastics in 1984, subsequently earning millions of dollars in en­
dorsement contracts, her vice-champion rapidly fell in oblivion without reaping any sig­
nificant financial benefits: who remembers Ecaterina Szabo, Kathy Johnson or Julianne 
McNamara? The difference between those gymnasts, however, cannot be argued to have 
been more than marginal, and was certainly not perfectly objectively measurable, hence 
partly attributable to luck5. Also, the investment, sacrifices, and effort consented must 
have been similar.
Competitive sport is only one among the WTA markets with extreme payoff for the 
winners, yet marginal differences between winners and losers, and where luck (chance) 
plays a central role. Show-business in general is the other most visible WTA market.
While the list of highly-paid Hollywood actors may seem long, it pales in comparison 
to the number of professionals in the performing arts struggling to make a living. As 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook reports, ” most actors 
struggle for a toehold in the profession and pick up parts wherever they can. (...) 
Median annual earnings of actors, directors, and producers were $27,400 in 1998. (...) 
In reality, earnings for most actors are low because employment is so erratic. Screen 
Actors Guild reports that the average income its members earn from acting is less than 
$5,000 a year.’’1
Extreme earnings differentials are also to be found among singers and musicians. 
Technological changes in the reproduction of sound and images have given artists a 
global reach that could not be thought of before. The number of highly paid performers
player, and before his recent second come-back. The average annual salary in the NBA in 1998 hovered 
around $2.5 million. Michael Schumacher earned about $50 million in 2000 as a Formula-One driver.
5In such instance, say the luck of being charismatic and having a pretty face. In other instances, it 
could be the luck of being from the appropriate country or having an artistic style fitting a certain mold,
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pales in comparison to the number struggling to make a living out of singing, acting, etc. 
It is nevertheless difficult to argue that in terms of talent or effort, the winners are such 
a huge distance away from an endless list of aspirant stars.
The key distinguishing features of such WTA markets, beyond the winner-take-all 
nature itself, are thus twofold. First, marginal differences in quality or effort can trans­
late in extreme differences in payoffs. Second, the payoff (outside option) of the losers 
are usually very low. We will henceforth characterize these markets as ’’full WTA”.
However important and visible the "glamorous” WTA markets described above may 
be, the extreme concentration of income in the U.S. and its increase over the past decades 
also find their root in another ’’strand” of WTA market with some characteristics that 
distinguish them from the ones just described.
Fortune’s ” America’s Forty Richest under 40” list consists almost exclusively of ex­
ecutives of companies in computer and internet related sectors. Thirteen of them held 
assets in excess of $1 billion in 2000. Forbes’ 2000 list of ”400 U.S. Richest” was still 
spearheaded by Bill Gates with assets of $63 billion. The total wealth of these 400 peo­
ple reached $1.2 trillion, equivalent to about 10 percent of the NYSE total market value 
at the end of 2000. Elsewhere, it is estimated that 2.5 million people in the U.S. hold 
liquid financial assets in excess of $1 million, representing total assets of $14.3 trillion6.
America’s wealthiests consist, in the end, mostly of highly paid executives, lawyers or 
investment bankers, more than ’’glamorous” stars. The extreme income of these people, 
we argue, also results to a large extent from their participation in a type of WTA market, 
where marginal differences in talent or effort may translate into extreme differences in 
payoffs.
The difference between a successful Disney manager and Michael Eisner may indeed 
be rather slim, whether in terms of education, effort on the job or managerial talent. The 
difference in earnings, however, is nothing but extreme. The same marginal difference 
often holds between a successful investment banker and a partner at Goldman Sachs, a 
successful lawyer and a partner in a top practice in New York, ...
6Merril Lynch and Gemini Consulting (2000).
120
As in the case of full WTA markets, chance and/or peculiar market structures play 
a key role in determining the outcome of who wins and how large the difference in 
payoff between a winner and a loser is. Also, marginal differences in talent or effort 
can translate in extreme differences in payoffs in what we will henceforth characterize as 
” partial WTA” markets.
A crucial difference between full and partial WTA markets resides in the outside 
option of the losers. While in full WTA markets, the payoff to the losers tends to 
be very low, losers in partial WTA markets tend to receive decent payoffs in any case. 
Losers in such markets are indeed managers that never made it as CEO, lawyers that 
could not make it to partner in a major practice, computer scientists that did not turn 
into Bill Gates or Lawrence Ellison, etc.
5 .3  M o d e llin g
No full general model is developed. Instead, we try to formalize some of the phenomena 
observed in WTA markets: why people take part, how they make their decisions to invest 
in such markets as opposed to education, and the consequences for inequality, aggregate 
investment in human capital and growth.
5.3.1 Full W TA  M arkets
Why do people invest in full WTA markets? Is the potential financial payoff sufficiently 
large to entice agents to invest despite the very small odds of winning? Is it sufficient to 
compensate for the partial ”randomness” of the outcome? Is it sufficient to justify large 
investments without clear knowledge of the actual probability of winning7? It is not 
obvious at first sight why participation in full WTA markets is empirically so important 
and generalized. Having answered these questions, it would be interesting as well to 
investigate whether there should be a link between individual wealth and the (relative) 
amount of investment in full WTA markets. Casual observation does indeed seem to
7The "type” of an agent in full WTA markets is often only revealed after a long period of significant 
investment: it is difficult to properly assess the probability of success early on.
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indicate that poorer families tend to invest relatively more in full WTA markets than 
richer families, in contrast to investment in education.
A Sim ple M odelling Tool
To build some intuition and concentrate on the very core issues of the problem, suppose
the following setting. A number N  of agents indexed by i live for two periods (1,2) and
receive an endowment A, * in both periods. For simplicity and without loss of generality, 
we postulate that A^i =  2 — A{. Agents differ in their individual endowments, which
are distributed in [A^A*1]. The endowment in period 1 can either be consumed or 
invested in a full WTA market. The amount Wi invested in the full WTA market 
provides the agent with a chance of winning a very large payoff S E in period 2 , where 
by assumption S E »  At .
The probability of winning in a full WTA market obviously depends on one’s invest­
ment, on the total number of participants, and on the others’ efforts (investment). To 
keep the framework as simple as possible, we will simply assume that the probability of 
winning, denoted as the probability of the binary variable X  taking value 1 , is given by
P { X  = Q\Wi) =  1 -  (1 -  e-7H,‘) p  (5.1)
P ( X  = l\Wi) = (l — e~~/Wi)p  (5.2)
where 7  and 0 < p < 1 are parameters. This functional form implies that we ignore 
the effect of others’ efforts on an individual’s probability of winning. By assumption 
as well, there are decreasing returns to the investment Wi: the probability of winning is 
capped at p regardless of the amount Wi invested, and the marginal ’’productivity” of 
Wi in increasing the probability of winning is falling in Wi.
In order to focus on the WTA market investment choice, we abstract from the possi­
bility of saving. Assuming A^i =  A,^ =  A,- implies zero saving if the subjective discount 
rate is equal to the interest rate in any case. Consumption in period 2 can thus take 
two values, depending on whether X  =  0 (losing) or X  =  1 (winning):
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c?  2 =  M
C l 2 =  j4 i +  SE
(5.3)
(5.4)
Agents maximize expected lifetime utility subject to their budget constraint:
maxU(Citi ) + 0 E [ U ( C i t2)] (5 .5)Wi
s.t. Citi =  Ai -  Wi . (5.6)
B(Ci,2) = Ai + E ( X ) S B (5.7)
This can be rewritten as
m axU (Ai — W;) +  /3 { [l — ( l -  e~^w>) p] U(A,)  +  (l -  e~~<w') PU (At + S B) } (5.8)Wi
Optimization thus requires that
U'(Ci,1) = ^ e ^ Wip [ U { A i + S E) - U { A i)] (5.9)
Equation (5.9) is a rather unconventional Euler equation. The marginal utility of
consumption in period 1 is indeed traded off against a marginal increment in the proba­
bility of obtaining a non-marginal jump in utility in period 2 from U (Ai) to U (Ai + S E). 
Utility of consumption in period 2 does not appear in marginal terms, but as a difference 
in utility levels between two possible states of the world.
W hy Do People Invest in Full W TA M arkets a t All?
A quick calibration allows us to draw some important conclusions about participation 
in full WTA markets. Assume a CES utility function U (C) =  -  , where 0 is the
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reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (9 = £).
Empirical studies do not agree on the magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution a. Hall (1988) finds evidence ''supporting the strong conclusion that the 
elasticity is unlikely to be much above 0.1, and may well be zero .” Beaudry and van 
Wincoop (1996), on the other hand, find ” evidence indicating that the IES is significantly 
different from zero and probably close to one”, by using a framework allowing for the 
existence of rule-of-thumb consumers who consume their current income.
Although empirical studies do not provide definite results, the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution is low in all likelihood. Relevant values of 9 are thus likely to be (well) 
above 1 , and perhaps as high as 10  or more, reflecting both alow intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution and a rapidly falling marginal utility of consumption.
A simple calibration can then be done. Assume that endowments are included in 
[A/, A71] and that the winning "prize” of the WTA markets is 100 times the highest 
endowment Ah. This merely assumes that the prize is "big” for any agent in the 
economy. We assume also that 7  =  jj-, which is just a way to postulate th a t if the 
agent with least resources invests his entire endowment of period 1 in the WTA market, 
he obtains a probability of winning that is very close to the maximum achievable, p. A 
reasonable assumption for p  seems to be that p < 0.01  and with the actual value probably 
significantly lower than 1 percent. "Overshooting” the actual value of p  obviously makes 
investment in the WTA market more attractive.
Using parameter values 9 = 2, p = 0.01, A* =  5, A h = 50 and (3 =  0.98, it is easy to 
verify that there exists no strictly positive value W f satisfying equation (5.9). In other 
words, the full WTA market is never attractive enough to justify any investment at all, 
even for the agents with highest endowments.
A robustness analysis shows that a positive equilibrium level of investment W* can 
be obtained only for non-realistically low values of 9 (say 9~ = 0.5), which implies an 
extremely high rate of intertemporal substitution and that the marginal utility of con­
sumption falls very slowly. It is thus not possible to reconcile empirical observations of
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large investments in full WTA markets, particularly by poorer agents, with a simple ex­
pected utility maximization model. This failure is similar to the failure of the expected 
utility model with risk-averse agents to explain people’s participation in lotteries (fair or 
unfair). This comparison suggests a more comprehensive approach that might explain 
agents’ participation in full WTA markets.
A M ore R ealistic View
Conlisk (1993), observes that standard expected utility theory, treating potential finan­
cial gain as the sole motive of gambling, is unable to explain the simultaneous purchase 
of lotteries and insurance. His paper then shows that if one accepts the assumption that 
gambling provides some utility of itself, however small, risk-averse behavior (purchas­
ing insurance) can be observed together with risk-loving behavior by a given optimizing 
agent.
This suggest a similar approach to the WTA issue. It seems rather obvious that 
individuals derive utility from participation in full WTA markets, in addition to the 
potential financial gain. Children do enjoy playing sports, acting or singing, and may 
have a strong preference for these activities as opposed to schooling. We will thus 
assume that individuals directly derive utility V  (W) from their investment W  in the 
WTA market.
Beyond earning high salaries and having an activity that provides utility by itself, 
winners in WTA markets also enjoy an additional payoff, which is not frequently recog­
nized or modeled by economists, but which can be very important: status. Friedman 
and Savage (1948) first pointed out that an individual’s utility function may depend on 
his own wealth relative to that of others in society. Similarly Becker, Murphy and Wern- 
ing (2 0 0 0 ) argue that status is an important element in consumers’ preferences and that 
status and income interact in some key ways in the utility function. They assume that 
utility is defined as U = u (c, s), with uc > 0, us > 0, Ucc < 0. Their key assumption is 
that Ucs > 0 , i.e. that a rise in status s increases the marginal utility of consumption c.
Because a gain in status (becoming a ’’star”) is such an important element of full 
WTA markets, we follow Becker et al. in assuming that the marginal utility of con­
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sumption is increasing in status. For simplicity, we assume that status can only have 
two states, 0  and 1 , depending upon whether one is a loser or a winner, respectively, 
in the WTA market. A practical way to capture the hypothesis is to assume that the 
utility function of a winner Uw (C) has the property that U™ > Uc for any given level of 
consumption. Or, more specifically, that
U(C)
I T ( C )
0W
Integrating these two assumptions, we have that agents seek to maximize the follow­
ing expected lifetime utility:
max U (CiA) +  eV  ( )  +  p E  [U (Cit2)\ (5.13)Wi
s.t. Citi = A i - W i  (5.14)
E ( C ia) =  J4j + £ ( A ') S B (5.15)
where U and V  are standard concave utility functions and e is a parameter repre­
senting the importance of the utility derived directly from participation in the WTA
market.
Optimization thus requires that
U ' (Ci,,) =  e V ' (Wi) + ■ [uw (Ai + S E) - U (i4i)] (5.16)
where dP^ ^ ) Wi  ^ = 7 e~lWip is the ’’marginal productivity” of Wi in increasing the 
probability of winning in the WTA market.
In his decision to invest in the WTA market, the agent considers several elements.
126
C 1~ — 1=  —-— -— in period 1 and if X  = 0 (loser in period 2) (5.10)1 — v
Q l - 0 v j  _  ^
=  —-—  ----  in period 2 if X  =  1 (winner in period 2) (5.11)
1 — uw
< 0 (5.12)
On the one hand, there is a trade off between the present utility cost of investing and 
the direct utility generated by participation in the WTA market. On the other hand, 
there is a trade off between the present utility cost of investing and the marginal return 
of that investment in terms of gain in the probability of experiencing a discrete jum p in 
utility in the second period.
It is clear from the assumptions that the LHS of equation (5.16) is continuously 
increasing in (given A{) and that the RHS is continuously decreasing in Wi, as 
it is the sum of the marginal utility of Wi and a term consisting of the product of the 
marginal productivity of Wi in increasing the probability of winning (decreasing in Wi by 
assumption) and a constant. A strictly positive and unique optimal level of investment 
is thus guaranteed if the two schedules cross. Whether they cross is not obvious at first 
sight.
If participation in the WTA market provides utility independently from consump­
tion, however, every agent will always invest a strictly positive amount, regardless of
endowment8. This would be the case even for small e because lim V ' (W ) = oo.9 In
w-> o
a way, deriving utility from participation in the WTA market allows agents to  diversify 
their ’’consumption basket”, an opportunity they would not pass, regardless of the size 
of the expected financial payoff in period 2. Equation (5.16) thus determines a unique 
optimal amount W* given endowment A{.
It is not possible in general to solve explicitly for the optimal level of investment 
in the WTA market W*, even if one assumes simple utility functions (say quadratic or 
logarithmic). Equation (5.16) does define an implicit function between Ai and W*, 
however. It is thus possible to study the properties of Differentiating equation
(5.16), we have that
d m A j - W j ) ]  B d P { X = I W )  d l U ^ t A i + S z y u j A i ) }
d W i _  _____________________dAj  +  P  9Wj_________________ dAi________________________  / r
8This result is similar to Conlisk (1993), who elaborates and provides additional proofs in the setting  
of lottery purchases.
9We allow for e to be small, but not so small that e —> 0 and e lim V'  I W)  ^  oo.
w-> o
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The sign of and hence the shape of the implicitly defined function W? =  h(A{) 
can be determined by looking at the sign of each element on the RHS of equation (5.17). 
The first term of the denominator is positive because we assume that the utility func­
tion U is concave in C\. Similarly, because the utility function V  and the function 
P  ( X  =  1|Wi) are both concave in Wi by assumption, the second and third terms are 
negative, making the whole denominator positive in all cases.
The first term of the numerator is negative by assumption as well. The sign of 
the second term depends on the sign of  ^ USA^]  ^ other part of the term
being positive. By assumption, Uw (•) is ’’less concave” than £/(•)> but the level of the 
argument in the function is augmented by S E in the former and not in the latter. The 
functions Uw (Ai -j- S E) and U (A{) are thus plotted as follows:
Figure 5.4: Uw (A{ +  S E) (dots) and U (A*)
By assumption, lim U' (A*-) =  oo. Because S E > 0, however, lim Uw (A{ 4 - S E) =  
c oo. It must then be that in some initial range of A{, the marginal utility of an extra 
unit of endowment is larger for a loser (with utility function U) than for a winner (with 
utility function Uw), despite the assumption that U is ’’more concave” than Uw. This 
latter fact, however, also means that at a certain level (call it Af),  the marginal utilities 
of an extra unit of endowment are equal for both loser and winner. For any level of 
endowment beyond A \ also, > ^d A -^  • This imphes that the difference
Uw (Ai -I- S E) — U (Ai) falls from a local maximum at A{ = O to a global minimum at a 
strictly positive level A \ and then rises again. We can thus conclude that
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d[U a (Ai + S E) - U ( A i) ]
dAi
dAi
<  0 V 0 <  Ai < A f
> 0  V Ai > A f
(5.18)
(5.19)
dw;Using this result, it is possible to determine the shape of If Ai >  A f, we
dlV:can conclude unequivocally that -j£- > 0 .  If 0 < Ai < A f on the other hand, we
dw;
~duu <have that ^  0 , depending on the assumptions on the utility functions and their
parameters. The implicit function W* — h (Ai) can thus take two possible shapes as 
shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. In the first case, if the positive term dominates the 
negative one when 0 < Ai < Af, we have
Ai
Figure 5.5: W? = h(A i)
In the second case, if the negative term dominates the positive one in a range between 
[0, Af], we have
W i
A i
Figure 5.6: W* = h(A i)
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The theory outlined above thus highlights two possible relationships between the 
level of endowment and the optimal amount of investment in the WTA market. The . 
monotonically increasing function is perhaps what may seem most intuitive at first sight. 
The simple model does show, however, that the relationship between endowment and 
the level of investment may be more complex than it seems.
The second case indeed shows that the level of investment as a function of endowment 
may follow a J-curve, which means that, in a stylized way, poor agents are enticed 
to invest more in a risky activity than "middle-class” agents, despite having a higher 
marginal utility of consumption in the first period. The attractiveness of investing 
in the WTA market later increases again as the agent moves from "middle-class” to 
"upper-class”. This, in a real-life example, would imply that those investing most in 
attempting to become sport or show-business stars, for example, should be found among 
the "lower-class” and the ”upper-class”.
Equation (5.16) points to a few more results about the agents’ optimal investment 
strategy. A higher valuation of participation in the WTA market per se, independently 
of the potential financial gain in period 2  (i.e. a high value of g r ) ,  clearly implies a higher 
choice of investment W*, ceteris paribus.
The importance of status in society, modeled here as a higher marginal utility of 
consumption for high-status people than low-status people, also influences the investment 
decision. Societies that give a very high status to winners provide more incentives for 
investment in WTA markets, and hence higher W*, ceteris paribus.. The size of the pure 
financial payoff of being a winner, S E, is also positively correlated with investment W*.
The simple modelling tool developed above allows us to derive some interesting results 
about participation in WTA markets. In particular, it shows that the ’’rich” , and more 
surprisingly and importantly the "poor” , may be those who choose to invest most in 
these types of risky markets with very uncertain but potentially large payoffs. This 
simplified framework, however, is limited in the sense that it focuses exclusively on a 
single investment choice, i.e. whether to invest in a WTA market, and how much. 
Thus, it cannot be used as is to explain why people may prefer to invest in full WTA 
markets as opposed to investing in other types of human capital, say education.
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5.3.2 P a rtia l W TA M arkets and  E ducation
Investing time, effort and money to learn singing, acting, running or playing basketball 
in the hope of becoming a ’’star” in the field may seem risky enough given the objective 
odds of winning. In contrast, it seems that education offers a rather safe payoff structure.
One should recognize that education in many cases also offers the possibility to ’’play” 
in what we define as partial WTA markets. As we saw. in the previous section, the 
majority of extreme income earners axe to be found among CEOs, lawyers, investment 
bankers, etc. The key difference between full WTA markets and partial WTA markets, 
as highlighted earlier, resides in the outside option of the losers.
This section seeks to model individuals’ choice of investment in education, which we 
characterize as a partial WTA market. The basic setting is similar to that used in the 
previous sections, in that we assume two-periods lived individuals maximizing expected 
lifetime utility.
At this stage, we need to introduce some assumptions about the return to education. 
While empirical studies differ on the exact specifications and parameters of the return to 
education, there is little doubt that education provides agents with a reasonable certainty 
of obtaining some kind of return, and that the payoff (wage) is increasing with the level 
of education. A high-school graduate can reasonably expect to find a better paid job 
than a high-school drop-out, but is also likely to be less paid than a college graduate, 
himself having lower wage expectations than someone with a graduate degree.
Such a relationship is obviously not fully empirically verified, but it is a useful and 
reasonable stylized fact that can serve as the basis for the assumption that education, 
in contrast to WTA types of human capital provides the individual with what will be 
denoted as certainty return S c (Hi). We assume that
S° (Hi) = S L + (  1 -  s  (5.20)
Equation (5.20) captures the assumption that education provides the individual with 
a non-random return that is an increasing function of the amount invested in period
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1, Hi. Implicit in equation (5.20) is the assumption that the non-random return to 
education is somehow capped at S L+  S, regardless of the amount Hi. This is not to say 
that the actual return to education is capped at that level, as we will also introduce a 
random, WTA-type, return to Hi later on. What this means is that a M aster’s graduate 
can expect ’’with certainty” a reasonably high wage, but that he cannot be certain to 
become one of the extremely highly paid managers.
Based on the amount invested in education Hi in period 1, an individual will thus 
earn with certainty a fraction ^1 — e~H?b of S> where a and b are shape and scale 
parameters, respectively. Using this specification allows us to capture several possible 
assumptions on the marginal return to education by varying a. Assuming th a t a <  1 
captures the assumption of a concave return function to investment Hi. Assuming that 
a >  1, on the other hand, allows to encompass a less traditional assumption about the 
marginal return to investment, which we argue is relevant in the case of education. If 
a >  1, the margined return to education is increasing at first, reaches a maximum at a 
strictly positive level of Hi and falls subsequently, as depicted in Figures 5.7 to 5.10.
H H
Fig. 5 .7: Total (dots) and marg. ret., a =  0.5 Fig. 5.8: Total (dots) and marg. ret., a =  1
H H
Fig. 5.9: Total (dots) and marg. ret., a =  2 Fig. 5.10: Total (dots) and marg. ret., a =  4
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A large proportion of the empirical work on the return to schooling postulates, fol­
lowing Mincer (1974), a linear relation between the logarithm of income Y  and years of 
schooling S  of the type logy =  a +  bS+ cX  + d X 2 + e, where X  is the number of years of 
experience. This linear relation in the logarithm of income implies that the growth rate 
of income for a marginal increase in schooling is constant and is equivalent to assuming 
that the absolute level of income is exponential in S, i.e. that the marginal return to 
schooling (in levels of income) is increasing everywhere in S'.10
A significant amount of empirical work has tended to confirm this log-linear relation­
ship (see Card, 1999). More recent empirical work has sought to test, however, whether 
the marginal return to education really is constant for any level of schooling. Hungerford 
and Solon (1987) and Belman and Heywood (1991) find evidence o f ’’sheepskin effects” 
in the returns to education, whereby wages rise faster with an extra year of education 
if it leads to a certificate. More interestingly, Belzil and Hansen (2000) conclude that 
”the null hypothesis that the local returns to schooling are constant is strongly rejected 
in favor o f a specification where the local returns are estimated using 8 spline segments. 
(...) The local returns are very low until grade 11 (less than 1 percent per year), increase 
to 3.8 percent in grade 12 and exceed 10 percent only from grade 14 to grade 16.”
New empirical work thus seems to point to non-constant returns to education, with 
low returns at low levels of schooling, peaking around college education before falling 
subsequently. Such a pattern intuitively reflects rather well the marginal return to 
education in developed economies. It seems indeed that obtaining a limited level of 
education offers little additional return with respect to fully unqualified labor. A critical 
minimum level of education seems to be necessary to ensure access to more qualified and 
better paid job.
In many ways, education also opens the door to participation in partial WTA markets, 
as we argued earlier. In order to capture this phenomenon, we assume that, in addition 
to the certainty return characterized above, education allows individuals to participate 
in a WTA market, which means that they may obtain a large payoff in addition to the 
certainty return, with some probability. Let this uncertainty return be modeled as
10The level of income is thus convex in schooling in Mincer’s specification.
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S u (Hi) = X S E (5.21)
where S E is large and X  is a binary random variable as in the previous section.
One can reasonably think that low levels of education provide little chance of winning 
in education-based partial WTA markets. In order to become one of the top earning 
lawyers, doctors or executives, one generally needs to hold the appropriate degree. It 
would thus be reasonable to model the probability of winning similarly to the certainty 
return to education.
Instead, for simplicity and without weakening the results, we will assume that the 
probability of winning (X  — 1) is as follows:
P ( x  = l |# i)  = T 7 ~  (5-22)
H
where H  is the average level of investment in education and M  is the number of 
participants.
The probability of winning is thus linear in Hi, which is not fully realistic but is 
a useful simplification that does not bias the results as it tends to overestimate the 
incentive to invest in education for the poor. Equation (5.22) implies that if everyone 
invests the same amount in education, all have a chance of winning.
Consumption in period 2 can take two values, depending on whether X  — 0 (losing) 
or X  — 1 (winning):
C& =  A i + S L + ( \ - e - H?b- a) s  
C},2 = At + S L +  ( l  -  e -" ? 6' 0)  S  + SE
As before, agents maximize expected lifetime utility subject to their budget con­
straint:
(5.23)
(5.24)
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max U {Ai — Hi) +  (3Hi
f  1 - J 3^ ) u  Ai  +  S L + ( l  -  s] +
'Ai + S L +  ( l  -  e -" ? ' - - )  5  + SE-LUl uM - 'H
(5.25)
Optimization requires that
V  (C,-.!) = [V  (Cii)\ + 9P{Xm m )  [V (c ? 2) -  U (C?2) j }  (5.26)
where dSQ^.^ = aH^~l b~ae~Hi b a S  is the ’’marginal productivity” of Hi in in­
creasing certainty return and dP X^d^ Hi  ^ =  is the ’’marginal productivity” of Hi inH
increasing the probability of being a winner in the partial WTA market.
The second term on the RHS of Euler equation (5.26) is similar to that analyzed in 
the previous section. It implies that agents trade off marginal utility of consumption in 
period 1 against an increased probability in jumping from the utility level of a loser to 
that of a winner. Ignoring status effects analyzed above and given that is a
constant by assumption, the second term on the RHS of equation (5.26) is decreasing in 
H i .
The first term on the RHS of equation (5.26) captures the traditional trade-off be­
tween marginal utility of consumption in period 1 and the gain in marginal utility in 
period 2 due to investment in education. By assumption, E  [Uf (C ^)] is decreasing in
Cit2 and hence in Hi. The marginal product of education in providing certainty return, 
OSc(H'} , on the other hand, behaves differently according to the value of the parameter 
a and can lead to significantly different conclusions.
Case 1 : T rad itional Concavity, a < 1
The case a < 1 captures the traditional neo-classical assumption that the marginal return 
to investment is everywhere decreasing and respects the Inada conditions at the lower and
q  P r  /j j . \
upper limits. Under such an assumption, ■ q H  i}E  \U' (Cj^)] is everywhere decreasing
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in Hi and equation (5.26) determines a unique and strictly positive level of investment 
in education for any given level of endowment A{, with the equilibrium Hi increasing in 
Ai. A strictly positive equilibrium always exists even though lim E  \U' (Ct^)] ^  oo,
because when a <  1, lim =  oo.
o
C ase  2: N on-C onvexities and  E ducational P o v erty  T rap , a > 1
The case a >  1 captures the idea that low levels of education provide relatively little 
certainty return. Optimal behavior as determined by Euler equation (5.26) is signif­
icantly different than in the "traditional” case: three possibilities arise, depending on 
the level of endowment Ai. These are easiest understood graphically. In all cases, the 
RHS of equation (5.26) describes a "bell curve" because lim dSQ ^ ^ E [U f (C ^)] =  0Hi —>0 *
and is increasing in an initial range then decreasing. The LHS is increasing in
Hi by assumption on the utility function.
If an agent’s endowment is low, equation (5.26) cannot be respected in any case as 
the two schedules never cross. The optimal decision is thus for the agent to undertake no 
investment in education whatsoever: maximum utility is reached with Hi =  0, Ci,i =  Ai 
and Ciy2 =  Ai +  S L. This can be seen from Figures 5.11 and 5.12.
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Fig. 5.11: RHS and LHS (dots), low A{ Fig. 5.12: Expected lifetime utility, low Ai
If an agent’s endowment is high enough, the two schedules cross at two points, the 
lower crossing point H f  and the upper crossing point H™, meaning that the Euler 
equation is respected twice and that there are two candidates for optimum (Figures 5.13 
and 5.14).
The lower crossing point H f  corresponds to a local minimum of expected lifetime
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utility, however. In the initial range of investment in education, the marginal return is 
low, which implies tha t the gain in marginal utility in period 2 is low as well. The gain 
in utility in period 2 through higher education, characterized by the area under RHS 
curve is lower than the loss in utility in period 1, characterized by the area under the 
LHS curve. Increasing education from Hi =  0 to Hf1 thus generates a net loss in utility 
equivalent to the area comprised between the two curves in that range.
0.9
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Fig. 5.13: RHS and LHS (dots), medium A { Fig. 5.14: Expected lifetime utility, medium Ai
Beyond H f  and up to H f11, the gain in utility in period 2 through higher educa­
tion becomes higher than the loss in utility in period 1, implying a net gain in utility 
equivalent to the area comprised between the two curves in that range.
It should be obvious then that H f  corresponds to a local minimum, while H f 1 
corresponds to a maximum, which could be either local or global. Whether it is global 
or local depends on whether the net loss associated with an increase in education from 
Hi =  0 to H f  is bigger or smaller than the net gain associated with an increase in 
education from H f  to H f 1.
If endowment Ai is at an intermediate level, the Euler equation is respected at two 
points, but H f 1 corresponds to a local maximum. The global maximum is still reached 
at the corner solution with zero investment in education. If endowment Ai is high 
enough, on the other hand, H f 1 corresponds to a global maximum (Figures 5.15 and 
5.16).
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Fig. 5.15: RHS and LHS (dots), high Ai Fig. 5.16: Expected lifetime utility, high Ai
In general then, we have that agents invest nothing in education up until an endow­
ment level A f 1 for which the following condition is respected:
Hf*
b
2| ^ £ [ y ' ( C i,2)] +  
2 2 ^ [ y ( c ? 2)-J/(cP2)]
H f
d H i -  J  U'(Ci, (5.27)
By integration, this condition can be rewritten in terms of the original expected 
lifetime utility maximization problem as
[U(AT) -  U (A T  -  H ? ) \  =  13 [ e  [U( a , 2)]|„j=„ r  -  [Ci,2]|Wi=0} (5.28)
Equation (5,28) means that agents invest in education only from the level of endow­
ment A f* at which the loss of utility in period 1 as a result of the investment iff*  (RHS) 
is exactly equal to the discounted gain in expected utility in period 2.
Optimal investment behavior thus requires that
H ■ =  0 if ^  < Af*
H- =  iff* if Ai >  Af*
(5.29)
(5.30)
This means that agents with low endowments are caught in an ’’educational poverty 
trap” . Because the return to investment in education is low in an initial range, the poor
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are unable to devote to education the amount of resources necessary to reap the high 
rewards of the investment.
By implicit differentiation, we can use equation (5.26) to determine the response of 
H?* to an increase in Ai. We have that
d [ U ' ( A i - H i ) )
dAi + P<
dHf*
dAi
, +
d S c(Hi) d[E[U' (Cita)])
QHi d Ai  \ H i =H \
d P { X = \ \ H j )  d [ u ( C l 2 ) - U ( C ? 2)\
dHi dAi \Hi=H?“
d P ( X = l \ H j )
dHi U ( c ‘2)  -  U ( c ? 2)
dHi I H i = H ( *
(5.31)
The denominator of equation (5.31) is always positive. The first term is positive by 
assumption on the utility function. The second term can be either positive or negative, 
depending on the point Hf* at which the derivative is evaluated. If it is evaluated to 
the right of the maximum of the RHS of equation (5.26), the derivative is negative and 
the denominator is obviously positive. If it is evaluated to the left of the maximum 
of the RHS of equation (5.26), the derivative is positive, but also necessarily smaller 
than the first term of the denominator. This is so because H™ is the second crossing 
point of a convex (LHS) and a concave (RHS) functions, which means that the difference 
RHS-LHS is decreasing in Hi from the left to reach zero at and hence necessarily 
that the derivative of the LHS is larger than that of the RHS. It follows then tha t the 
denominator is always positive.
The first term of the numerator is negative by assumption on the utility function. 
The second term is also negative, however, which means that we cannot sign unequiv­
ocally the numerator. As we have seen earlier, however, it must be that no positive 
equilibrium H* exists for an initial range of endowments. This means that, in order 
to have positive levels of investment in education H* for some range of endowments at 
least, Hf* must be increasing in Ai. If this is true, then the numerator is positive, and 
the level of investment in education, when different from zero, is increasing in Ai.
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We will assume that if this is true for some lower-middle range of endowment A* 
(which it must be in order to have at least some agents investing in education), it is also 
true for higher ranges of endowment. This is most likely as ^ j / r ^ converges to zero 
for large Hi.
The equilibrium level of investment in education, H ?, is thus equal to zero in some 
initial range of endowment [0 , A f4], jumps to a strictly positive level at A f1 and then 
increases continuously with Ai. This is confirmed by simulations, which additionally 
show that the increasing section of H* is concave, which was to be expected as the 
marginal return to education converges to zero as Hi becomes large.
Agents with insufficiently high endowment are caught in the educational poverty trap. 
Because the return to education is high only for sufficiently large levels of investment, the 
poor are unable to mobilize enough resources to finance the critical level of education 
in the absence of financial markets. Non-convexities in the return to education thus 
reinforce ex-ante inequality among agents: the poor are bound to remain poor, while the 
rich are in a situation to reinforce their status in period 2 by investing large amounts in 
education. Escaping the educational poverty trap is not possible at all in the absence 
of a financial mechanism that allows agents with low endowments to invest sufficiently 
in education.
Public funding of education seems an obvious way to allow the poor to exit the 
educational poverty trap. One should note, however, that it may not be sufficient if the 
publicly provided amount of education (say compulsory ’’free” schooling) is below the 
threshold at which the return to education becomes really high. In such a case, poor 
agents may still optimally decide not to finance by themselves the incremental amount 
of education that does provide high return, particularly if the level of ’’free” publicly 
provided education already involved significant costs, say in terms of forgone earnings or 
non-publicly covered expenses in books, tutoring, etc.
5.3.3 H um an C apital Investm ent Choices
How do agents choose between investing in full WTA markets and education? Does 
initial wealth play a role? We have tried in the previous sections to provide a framework
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to advance some answers to these questions. While it may not be fully realistic to 
characterize the investment decision as an either/or choice, it is a plausible simplification 
in that dedication (in terms of time and effort) is necessary for either type of investment, 
which are difficult to combine in reality.
It appears clearly from the previous two sections that poor agents may be ’’forced” 
out of the education choice. In a way, they are pushed into gambling for a very uncertain 
but high potential financial payoff in the future by investing in an activity that provides 
some utility in itself.
Agents with higher endowments, on the other hand, are in a position to invest suf­
ficiently large amounts in education so as to obtain significant certainty returns in the 
future, which makes the investment worthwhile. They also enter the education-based 
partial WTA market, which gives them a probability of becoming one of the extremely 
rich.
The investment choices optimally made by agents in this setting are thus such that 
ex-ante inequality is reinforced ex-post. While the "extremely rich” in period 2 are 
drawn from the ex-ante poor as well as the ex-ante rich, the vast majority of the ex-ante 
poor are likely to remain so because they are pushed to invest in risky activities, while 
the ex-ante rich are in a position to ensure themselves a relatively high income through 
education.
Paradoxically, one can see that the incentive for the poor to invest in education rather 
than in the full WTA skill is lower if the minimum wage or unskilled wage, S L is high. 
The return S L is indeed the ’’outside option” of a loser in the full WTA market (with 
education Hi = 0). The higher the utility of the outside option, the more attractive the 
gamble is.
5.4  Inequality , W T A  M arkets, H um an C ap ita l and  G row th
The rising inequality observed since the 1970s is most often explained in terms of skill- 
biased technological change, along the lines of Acemoglu (1998). According to this 
argument, technological progress has generated a shift in relative demand in favor of
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skilled labor, which has increased the wage premium relative to unskilled labor, despite 
the increased supply of skilled labor.
While this line of argument is quite convincing in order to explain the increasing 
wage differential between labor of distinct skill levels, it does not offer much when it 
comes to explain the sharp rise in income or wealth concentration among the very top 
of the distribution (top 5 percent or 1 percent). Yet, this has also been an important 
phenomenon of the 1980s and 90s, which has significantly contributed to rising overall 
inequality.
Frank and Cook (1995) show informally how WTA markets have become more and 
more prevalent in the U.S. over the past decades. Our framework seeks to understand 
why people actually decide to invest in such markets as opposed to investing in education. 
If one accepts that WTA markets have become more prevalent over the past decades, 
and that the poor tend to be disproportionately attracted by investment in such markets, 
a mechanism for rising income inequality at the top is in place. The poor will indeed 
remain so with a very high probability, while the increased prevalence of WTA markets 
will generate more winners and more concentration of earnings/wealth at the top.
Lucas (1988) advanced that economic growth is driven by the accumulation of human 
capital. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) later proposed the idea 
that , inequality may be harmful to growth in the absence of financial markets. Their 
argument rests on the assumption that the marginal return to  investment is decreasing 
at the individual level and that it is thus productivity-enhancing to distribute any given 
amount of total investment equally across all individuals. A more equal society would 
thus generate more growth, they argue, as a result of a better distribution of global 
investment across individuals.
The next sections consider two issues. We first look at whether inequality can 
be reduced through taxation on the extreme returns (SE) without having excessive 
disincentive effects on the accumulation of human capital. We then briefly look at 
whether redistribution could generate an increase in the aggregate amount invested in 
education, and hence raise growth.
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5.4.1 R edistributive Taxation and Incentives
Suppose that a proportional tax t is levied on the extreme return S E. W hat is its effect 
on the agents’ decision to invest in the full WTA market (W) or in education (if)?
In the case of the full WTA market, Euler equation (5.16) becomes
V  ( a , i )  =  eV' (Wi) +  p dP{Xd w llWi) [U™ (Ai +  (1 -  t)S E) -  U (A-)] (5-32)
Differentiating implicitly, the effect of taxation on the equilibrium investment in the 
full WTA market, W*, is given by
dWi* _  (•)
dt ~  ap^Ai-Wi)i _  [D,  (Ai +  (1 _  t)SE) _  v  <
(5.33)
Increasing taxation thus reduces the incentive to invest in the full WTA market. 
Note, however, that investment in Wi occurs partly as a result of the direct utility 
derived from the activity. At the limit, even if the financial payoff of being a winner is 
fully taxed (t = 1), agents thus continue to invest a strictly positive amount in Wj.
By implicit differentiation, we can calculate that the effect of taxation on the equi­
librium investment in education, 17*, is given by
dH* = m ) S BU" (c?2) + aplxa- ) W s BU' (c?2)}
~lH =  — ---------------------- 1----------^ T T ------------------------------------------ (5-34)J (<3,2)1 +
dP(X=l\Hj)  
d[U'(Ai-Hi )] p  I  dHi u  ( c h )  -  u  (eg ,)
where C}2 = Ai +  S L +  (1 — e Hi b °) S  +  (1 — t) SE.
We have already explained why the denominator in equation (5.34) is always positive. 
The numerator, on the other hand, could be either positive or negative, as the first term
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c I H *is always negative, while the second term is always positive. This means that ^  0, 
i.e. a rise in the tax rate t could increase as well as decrease the equilibrium level of 
investment in education H* (assuming that this level is strictly positive), which may 
seem paradoxical since taxation reduces the (expected) payoff to the investment.
Two forces are at play to explain this result. On the one hand, taxing extreme 
income S E does indeed reduce the incentive to invest in education as the financial payoff 
for the winners in education-based partial WTA market is reduced. The extra level of 
utility that is gained by winning (U C}2 — U j^C^j) is lower as a result of the tax, 
which lowers the incentive to invest in education in order to ’’play” in the WTA game. 
This is captured by the second term in the denominator of the RHS of equation (5.34).
On the other hand, taxing extreme income S E also increases the expected marginal 
utility in period 2, E  [U' (C^)]. Because the ’’certainty return” to education is valued in 
terms of the expected marginal utility it brings in period 2 , raising the latter obviously 
makes the investment in education for "certainty return” reasons more attractive. This 
is captured by the first term in the denominator of the RHS of equation (5.34).
Whether increasing the tax rate t ends up reducing or raising the equilibrium level 
of investment in education H* thus depends on which of the two effects dominates 
the other. This will obviously depend on the values of the parameters, as well as 
the level of endowment Ai at which the impact of the tax is evaluated. The most 
important conclusion one has to draw from this is that taxing extreme income S E does 
not necessarily have a negative incentive effect on the accumulation of capital H , and 
that if the effect is negative, it is likely to be very small as the ’’certainty return” to 
investment in education is unaffected by the tax.
5.4.2 Endowm ent Inequality  and G row th
The peculiar structure of full or partial WTA markets is thus such that taxation on 
extreme returns seems possible without introducing major disincentive effects on the 
accumulation of human capital. It appears possible then, to put in place a redistributive 
mechanism financed from taxation on extreme income whereby the redistribution of 
income allows (some of) the poor to exit the educational poverty trap, without much
144
reducing the level of investment in education through taxation. This could lead, in 
aggregate, to a higher level of education, and hence higher output.
A redistributive tax on extreme income, beyond having a direct impact on inequality 
could thus also have a sizeable impact by allowing some segment of the poor to exit the 
educational poverty trap. W hat the formal analysis of the previous sections shows, how­
ever, is that redistribution needs to be large enough if it is to be effective in taking people 
out of the educational poverty trap. A small amount of redistribution (say through cash 
payments) may indeed be insufficient to provide the incentive for poorer people to invest 
in education rather than in a full WTA skill. The amount of redistribution necessary 
would depend not only on a person’s endowment, but also on the ’’amount” of education 
necessary to reach a high marginal payoff.
It might be better then to focus redistribution on a sub-group of the population 
at first in order to pull that group out of the educational poverty trap, rather than 
immediately spread the entire proceeds of the tax on attempting -but failing for lack of 
resources- to pull the entire ’’poor” group out of the trap. This dynamic setting is not 
modelled here, but if pulling a ’’household” out of the educational poverty trap can be 
perpetuated, it might be more efficient to focus redistribution on successive sub-groups 
over time, so as to progressively pull the entire population out of the trap. Attempting 
to do it all at once may indeed be impossible for lack of resources.
5.5  C onclusion
The spectacular rise in inequality in the U.S. over the past decades remains partly a the­
oretical puzzle. Skill-biased technological change arguments are theoretically appealing 
and elegant, and have definite empirical relevance. As we have argued, however, they 
only offer a partial explanation as they cannot tell us why income has tended to concen­
trate so much at the very top of the distribution, even though this concentration is in 
large part responsible for the increase in inequality over the past decades.
We have argued that the rise of WTA markets is an important reason of such a 
concentration of income. This chapter focuses on the reasons why agents might want
145
to focus their investment in human capita] on such markets instead of education, by 
making a few assumptions summarizing key characteristics of WTA markets.
By focusing on the investment decision, we show that the ’’poor” may in fact be 
attracted relatively more than the ’’middle class” in investing in a very risky type of 
human capital. Given the peculiar shape of-returns to education, agents with low 
endowments may be caught in an educational poverty trap, which means tha t they end­
up focusing their human capital investment on a very risky type of capital that provides 
direct utility, but that yields a very unlikely financial payoff, even though potentially 
extreme.
By doing so, ex-ante poverty is reinforced ex-post. We show that, given the incentive 
structure of investing in education, taxing the extreme payoff of winners in WTA markets 
may have very small disincentive effects. In fact, taxation of the extreme payoff may, 
in theory, even generate an extra incentive to invest in education.
Under such circumstances, it appears possible to introduce taxation on extreme in­
come with the view of reducing inequality, pulling the poor out of the education poverty 
trap and increasing aggregate investment in education (growth). It emerges, however, 
that attempting to pull too many people too quickly out of the poverty trap may prove 
unproductive. Instead, focusing limited resources on a more restricted number of people 
sequentially may be more useful.
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Chapter 6
C onclusion
The links from growth to inequality and inequality to growth are manyfold, complex 
and particularly important for reasons related to poverty and social justice in particu­
lar, but also efficiency and welfare maximization. The complexity and breadth of the 
issues involved clearly prevent all-encompassing analyses. Instead, we focused on a few 
specific questions here, which has allowed us to derive some new theoretical results with 
normative implications.
Focusing on developing countries at first, we sought to determine how within-country 
inequality and international convergence (cross-country inequality) would behave in a 
dual economy subject to ’’globalization”, narrowly defined as an opening of the economy 
to capital flows from abroad. In particular, we wanted to address the following questions: 
what determines the size and timing of capital flows from abroad? Why do certain 
countries attract so much more capital than others? Who benefits most, domestically, 
from capital flows, the ’’rich” or the ’’poor”?
The model elaborated in Chapter 3 allows us to answer these questions. The dual 
economy generates within-country inequality. While the rich operate, by assumption, 
in the sector that is susceptible to attract capital from abroad, we show that they do not 
disproportionately benefit from opening the economy to capital flows. ’’Globalization” 
in fact does not widen the relative gap between rich and poor at first, even though 
the absolute wage gap increases. This rather counter-intuitive result (the rich operate 
with more capital as a result of the opening up of the economy and hence their labor
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productivity increases) is explained by the complementarity in ”output” between the 
two sectors of the economy, which is absent in the traditional approach in the line of 
Kuznets. An expansion of overall productivity in the ’’rich” sector thus also benefits 
the ’’poor” sector.
While ’’globalization” does not widen relative inequality at first, we show that it 
doubly benefits the poor in that it immediately raises their productivity and, most 
importantly, in that it allows the gap between rich and poor to close at an accelerated 
pace. While the gap would eventually close in any case in the framework of the model, 
opening up allows faster reduction in within-country inequality.
Opening up the economy to capital flows also benefits rich and poor alike by allow­
ing a faster pace of international convergence, i.e. a faster reduction in cross-country 
inequality. The duality of the economy allows us to show, however, why convergence is 
not immediate despite international capital flows. It also underlines that the amount 
and timing of capital flows from abroad ultimately hinges upon domestic factors. Of 
particular importance are the development of good domestic infrastructures in terms 
of education and health, basic transportation and other services, and hence domestic 
saving. In other words, foreign investment (capital flows in general) follows domestic 
investment rather than precedes it.
The dual economy model of Chapter 3 is a useful characterization of a typical devel­
oping country, but it does not properly represent the structure of a developed economy, 
and it generates the conclusion that within-country inequality converges to zero in the 
long run. This, obviously, we do not observe in even the most developed economies. 
While it appears empirically that the more developed economies tend to have lower lev­
els of inequality than lesser developed countries, inequality remains significant. There 
appears thus to be some kind of ’’steady-state” level of inequality.
The model of Chapter 4 seeks to investigate the roots of such an equilibrium level 
of inequality. Using an endogenous growth model, we typify the ’’developed” economy 
as one with a multiplicity (a continuum) of sectors, each mobilizing a share of the labor 
force. Growth is endogenized by allowing monopolistic production of intermediate goods 
of particular vintages and hence generating an incentive for R&D.
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We then show how the labor force is permanently being reallocated across sectors, 
according to the level of technology attained in any sector at any given time, relative 
to all other sectors. Introducing frictions in the labor reallocation process, we show 
that equilibrium inequality emerges. It turns out then, that inequality is essentially 
determined by the extent of frictions in the labor reallocation process.
Such frictions, we show, influence steady-state growth in non-trivial ways. In fact, 
sub-optimal allocation of labor across sectors (an allocation that fails to equalize marginal 
productivities) may generate higher steady-state growth than an optimal allocation in 
the sense of equalized marginal productivities.
As a result, we show that the relationship between inequality and growth can be 
particularly complex. Different countries may exhibit different relationships depending 
on their characterizing parameters, and even a given country may or may not face a 
trade-off between equilibrium growth and inequality depending upon where it finds itself 
relative to the growth-maximizing amount of labor reallocation rigidities.
In Chapter 4, we thus draw a particularly nuanced view of the growth/inequality 
nexus through the introduction of a third parameter: frictions in labor force reallocation 
across sectors. This allows us also to shed some new light on another segment of the 
literature, that seeks to explain growth patterns through sectoral shifts in the labor force.
The prevalence of inequality even within the most developed countries led us to seek 
to explain the causes of such equilibrium inequality. There has also been, however, a 
tendency for inequality to increase again in many of the most developed economies over 
the past decades. In Chapter 5, we look critically at the traditional explanations of this 
phenomenon as they have been put forward in the literature. We underline that such 
explanations are unable to capture an important issue at the root of the recent increase 
in inequality: the extreme concentration of income at the top.
We then look at one potential explanation for such a concentration: the rising preva­
lence of winner-take-all (WTA) markets. Instead of modeling such markets in details, we 
seek to understand why agents may wish to participate in them. In particular, we show
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how the poor may be disproportionately drawn to invest in such markets as opposed to 
investing in education, hence reinforcing ex-ante inequality.
We show that expected utility theory relating investment decisions exclusively to 
expected financial gains is unable to explain participation in typical WTA markets. 
Given the payoff structure and incentives to invest in WTA markets and the peculiar 
payoff structure of education, we explain why the poor may be drawn into investing in 
WTA markets rather than in education, and more so than the rich. This phenomenon, 
apart from perpetuating inequality, also has potential effects on growth, inasmuch as one 
accepts that growth is driven by the accumulation of certain types of human capital.
Analyzing the payoff structure of WTA markets, we also show tha t it may be pos­
sible to tax extreme income earners without affecting incentives to invest very much. 
There might thus be room for a redistributive tax that would not excessively discourage 
investment, while at the same time allow the poor to be taken out of poverty sustainably 
and positively affect growth.
